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I. INTRODUCTION
It has certainly become typical to describe current debates over hot-
button social and legal doctrines as reflecting what James Davison Hunter 
identified as the “culture wars.”1 By that, Hunter famously intended to
capture how ongoing clashes over headline-grabbing social issues reflected 
deeper divisions “over the very meaning and purpose of the core institutions 
of American civilization.”2 Thus, the salience of debates over abortion, 
contraception, and same-sex marriage stemmed from core arguments— 
between groups Hunter labeled “traditionalists” and “progressives”3— 
over the meaning of motherhood, family, and sexuality. Together, these 
debates reflected a conflict over the very definition of America.4 
In the years after Hunter first published Culture Wars: The Struggle to 
Define America,5 some critics argued these so-called wars did not trickle 
down to average Americans; instead, they contended, the culture wars  
were battled among political elites, activists, and journalists.6 But recent
polling data highlighting the growing political polarization of Americans
has, to some extent, bolstered Hunter’s claims that contemporary 
conflicts reflect an underlying and growing divide between progressives
and traditionalists over the definition of America and American culture.7 
 1.  See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1991).
 2.  JAMES DAVISON HUNTER & ALAN WOLFE, IS THERE A CULTURE WAR?: A
DIALOGUE ON VALUES AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 13 (2006).
 3.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 84, 96. 
 4.  See generally id.
 5.  See id.
 6.  See generally, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE,
CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2004); ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, 
AFTER ALL (1998). 
 7.  See generally STEPHEN HAWKINS ET AL., HIDDEN TRIBES: A STUDY OF AMERICA’S 
POLARIZED LANDSCAPE (2018), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a70a7c3010027736a22
740f/t/5bbcea6b7817f7bf7342b718/1539107467397/hidden_tribes_report-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3ZE5-CJXZ]; Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological
Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affects Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, PEW
RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization- 
in-the-american-public [https://perma.cc/998U-2VHR]. However, as Steven Smith notes, 
Hunter himself made more modest claims about the penetration of these culture wars into
widespread American consciousness. See STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN
THE CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC 263–64 (2018). 
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Central to Hunter’s contentions was a secondary claim that these culture
wars triggered new cross-cutting alliances between traditionalists within 
various faith communities.8  In Hunter’s words, historical divisions between,
for example, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews had morphed whereby “[t]he
orthodox traditions in these faiths now have much more in common with each 
other than they do with progressives in their own faith traditions, and vice  
versa.”9 Indeed, a recent Pew Research Center survey provided an important
example of this phenomenon: American Jews.10  According to the study,
which asked about frequency of attendance at religious services, attitudes 
about homosexuality, and the percentage of registered Republicans, Orthodox
Jews resembled evangelical Christians far more than other Jewish 
denominations, such as Conservative and Reform Jews.11 
Recognizing that American Jewish denominations increasingly diverged 
in their political and religious attitudes raised important questions about 
how American Jews might intervene in the ongoing culture wars—and in 
particular, recent legal debates over what might be the most salient
culture-war controversy: the appropriate scope of religious liberty.  Over
the past decade, contestation over the scope of religious liberty reached
an apex as it came into conflict with other deeply held social values, such
as same-sex marriage and contraception.12 And as these questions increasingly 
found their way to the Supreme Court—in cases such as Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc.13 and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission14—“the rapid changes and reversals of view . . . have 
thrown one of the central aspects of the American church-state settlement
into question.”15 
As these debates over religious liberty persisted, commentary turned to
the denominational divide within the American Jewish community.  Did
the realignment of faith communities predicted by Hunter hold true for
 8.  See HUNTER & WOLFE, supra note 2, at 16. 
 9.  Id.
10. See generally LUIS LUGO ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., A PORTRAIT OF JEWISH AMERICANS
(Sandra Stencel et al. eds., 2013), http://assets.pewresearch.ofrg/wp-content/uploads/sites/
11/2013/10/jewish-american-full-report-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2CD-BXFM]. 
11. Id. at 76, 95–98. 
12. See generally Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154
(2014) (analyzing the legal and social factors that made Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. such a controversial case). 
13.  134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
14.  138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
15. Horwitz, supra note 12, at 158. 
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Jewish approaches to the frontline, so to speak, of the contemporary
culture wars? The standard answer has been a yes—but a yes of a certain
kind. Conservative and Reform Jews supported the government’s authority 
to require employers to provide contraception16 as well as to apply the
demands of antidiscrimination law17 over and above claims for religious 
exemptions to such requirements. By contrast, the institutions of American 
Orthodox Judaism have generally sided with the religious liberty claimants 
even when doing so comes at the potential expense of antidiscrimination 
law and the need for cost-free contraception.18 
Many of the popular claims about this realignment have not only
identified this denominational split but have also argued that it represented
a contortion—if not outright perversion—of the historical approach of the
Jewish community on questions of religious liberty.19  Thus, the denominational
16. See Central Conference of American Rabbis Resolution on State Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts, CCAR (May 6, 2015), https://www.ccarnet.org/ccar-resolutions/
ccar-resolution-state-religious-freedom-restoratio/ [https://perma.cc/FZA8-6XV4] [hereinafter
CCAR on State RFRAs] (“[The CCAR] [d]eplores the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
federal RFRA in Hobby Lobby, which extended religious freedom rights to at least some
corporations.”); Rabbinical Assembly Expresses Grave Concerns over Hobby Lobby
Decision, RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/story/rabbinical-
assembly-expresses-grave-concern-over-hobby-lobby-decision [https://perma.cc/22AE-WSA7]
(“To the extent that any Justice on the court intended today’s decision to be read as
justifying a denial of access to women’s contraceptive choices based on employers’ religious
beliefs, we categorically reject that interpretation.”).
17.  See generally, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae the Central Council of American 
Rabbis et al., Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 5036302 (including as 
amici Central Conference of American Rabbis; Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association;
Union for Reform Judaism; and Women of Reform Judaism); Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-
Defamation League et al., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App.
2015) (No. 2013-0008), 2015 WL 13622555 (including as amici Bend the Arc: A Jewish
Partnership for Justice; Central Conference of American Rabbis; Hadassah: The Women’s
Zionist Organization of America; Keshet; National Council of Jewish Women; Nehirim, 
Reconstructionist Rabbinical College and Jewish Reconstructionist Communities; T’ruah: 
The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights; Union for Reform Judaism; and Women of Reform
Judaism).
18. See, e.g., Press Release, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America 
Welcomes Supreme Court Ruling Defending Religious Liberty in Face of State Government
Hostility, ORTHODOX UNION ADVOC. CTR. (June 4, 2018), https://advocacy.ou.org/union-
orthodox-jewish-congregations-america-welcomes-supreme-court-ruling-defending-
religious-liberty-face-state-government-hostility-7-2-ruling-masterpiece-cakeshop-case-sen/
[https://perma.cc/HVC8-6NLD]; Press Release, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations 
Applauds Supreme Court “Hobby Lobby” Ruling Upholding Religious Liberty in “Obamacare” 
Mandate, ORTHODOX UNION ADVOC. CTR. (June 30, 2014), https://advocacy.ou.org/union-
orthodox-jewish-congregations-applauds-supreme-court-hobby-lobby-ruling-upholding-
religious-liberty-obamacare-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/MM6C-Z9WV]. 
19. Jill Jacobs, Why Are Orthodox Organizations Embracing Christian Values?, FORWARD
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://forward.com/opinion/spirituality/387741/why-are-orthodox-organizations-
embracing-christian-values/ [https://perma.cc/U7TF-J87J]; Batya Ungar-Sargon, Are
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divergence was, according to such accounts, the result of a rightward shift 
within the institutions of Orthodox Judaism that had increasingly embraced a
broad view of the religious exemptions legally due to faith communities.20 
For example, Rabbi Jill Jacobs, executive director of the Jewish human
rights organization, T’ruah, penned an op-ed in the Jewish Daily Forward 
titled Why Are Orthodox Organizations Embracing Christian Values?21 
Two weeks later, Batya Ungar Sargon, opinion editor of the Forward, titled a
news column, asking Are Orthodox Jews Assimilating to the Christian
Right?22 The implied answer: yes. Importantly, the evidence for both authors 
focused primarily on Orthodox Jewish advocacy for religious exemptions
from government regulation.23 Jacobs pressed this view, criticizing the
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America—one of the largest
umbrella organizations of American Orthodox Judaism—for “voic[ing]
its support for religious exemptions for employers who refuse to provide 
birth control as part of their health care plan.”24 And Ungar Sargon described
this same shift by highlighting religious liberty disputes as providing “another 
layer of tissue connecting Orthodox Jews with the Christian right.”25 
Moreover, the laments over this purported rightward shift within Orthodox
Judaism have had a sense of urgency—urgency that flowed from recent 
demographic trends.26 Recent polls have identified not only a denominational 
divergence within the American Jewish community but also a fundamental 
shift in demographics. For example, in 2013, the Pew Research Center
released a report titled A Portrait of Jewish Americans,27 which—summarized 
Orthodox Jews Assimilating to the Christian Right?, FORWARD (Dec. 3, 2017), https:// 
forward.com/opinion/388782/are-orthodox-jews-assimilating-to-the-christian-right/ [https://
perma.cc/6WDD-UZA6]. 
20. See Jacobs, supra note 19.
21. See id.
22. See Ungar Sargon, supra note 19. 
23. See Jacobs, supra note 19; Ungar Sargon, supra note 19. To be sure, Nathan Diament, 
Executive Director for Public Policy of the Orthodox Union, has previously articulated the
OU’s rationale. See Nathan J. Diament, Why the Orthodox Union Supports Religious Exemptions 
to the Contraception Mandate, TABLET (Jan. 28, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.tabletmag. 
com/scroll/160928/why-the-orthodox-union-opposes-the-contraception-mandate [https://
perma.cc/D8CE-V83J]; Aylana Meisel & Mitchell Rocklin, American Jews—Not Just the 
Orthodox—Should Join Christians in Defending Religious Liberty, FORWARD (Dec. 20,  
2017), https://forward.com/opinion/national/390474/american-jews-not-just-the-orthodox-
should-join-christians-in-defending-rel/ [https://perma.cc/C696-85YE]. 
24. Jacobs, supra note 19.
25. Ungar Sargon, supra note 19. 
26. See LUIS LUGO ET AL., supra note 10, at 7.
27. Id.
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in the words of one expert—painted a picture where “[t]he Orthodox
population . . . is exploding. The non-Orthodox are in sharp decline.”28 
While Orthodox Jews currently make up only 10% of the total American
Jewish population—with Reform Jews making up 35% and Conservative 
Jews making up 18%—trends point to that number rising significantly in
coming years.29 For example, among American Jews aged 0–17, 27% are 
Orthodox;30 the birth rate among American Orthodox Jews is 4.1 children 
per family;31 Orthodox Jews marry much younger than their non-Orthodox 
counter-parts;32 only 2% of Orthodox Jews marry outside of the Jewish
community;33 and 69% of Orthodox Jews are members of a synagogue.34 
Accordingly, if Orthodox Jews were truly deviating from the historical
Jewish approach to religious liberty, that trend would have a growing impact
on the so-called Jewish voice as Orthodox Judaism secured a larger and larger
share of the Jewish demographic. In turn, criticism of Orthodox Jewish
institutions has entailed a secondary claim; in the coming decades, the
dominant stance within American Judaism on questions of religious liberty
would look far more like that of Evangelical Christianity. As a result, this
stance would deviate from the professed established Jewish approach and
move the Jewish community to the traditionalist side of the ledger with
respect to religious liberty debates at the center of the culture wars.35 
Not surprisingly, given the continued contestation over denominational 
and religious realignment, questions surrounding the appropriate place of 
American Jews within the broader culture wars have persisted—most
recently in debate over one of the central theses of Steven Smith’s book, 
Pagans and Christians in the City.36 Adopting much of the Hunter framework,
Smith’s extraordinary work—extraordinary in both intellectual breadth
and analytical incisiveness—seeks to reframe recent culture-war debates
as not a clash between religion and secularism but as a clash between two 
28. Steven M. Cohen, Dramatic Orthodox Growth Is Transforming the American
Jewish Community, FORWARD (Dec. 19, 2016), https://forward.com/opinion/357517/
dramatic-orthodox-growth-is-transforming-the-american-jewish-community/ [https://perma.cc/
H6JN-3D2U].
29. LUIS LUGO ET AL., supra note 10, at 10. 
30. Cohen, supra note 28. 
31. LUIS LUGO ET AL., supra note 10, at 40. 
32. Orthodox Jews More Likely to Marry at Younger Age, PEW RES. CTR., (Aug. 
25, 2015), https://www.pewforum.org/2015/08/26/a-portrait-of-american-orthodox-jews/pr_
2015-08-26_orthodox-jews-05/ [https://perma.cc/S6MM-RCGE].
33. LUIS LUGO ET AL., supra note 10, at 37. 
34. Id. at 60. 
35. See Ari Feldman & Laura E. Adkins, Orthodox to Dominate American Jewry in
Coming Decades as Population Booms, FORWARD (June 12, 2018), https://forward.com/news/
402663/orthodox-will-dominate-american-jewry-in-coming-decades-as-population/ [https:// 
perma.cc/NTQ5-DDSX]. 
36. See SMITH, supra note 7, at 111. 
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views of the sacred: modern paganism and proto-typical faith-communities.37 
In Smith’s words, “Pagan religion locates the sacred within this world. In 
that way, paganism can consecrate the world from within: it is religiosity
relative to an immanent sacred. Judaism and Christianity, by contrast, 
reflect a transcendent religiosity; they place the sacred, ultimately, outside 
the world . . . .”38 In this way, Smith argues that both sides in the ongoing
culture wars—progressives and traditionalists—maintain their own views 
of the sacred. Both are, so to speak, religious.
On this account, the core difference between the warring combatants in 
the culture wars flows not from which side believes in the sacred, but which
is willing to allow for the possibility of a transcendent—or otherworldly—
vision of the sacred. According to Smith, progressives—who he characterizes
as modern pagans—resist extending religious accommodations to 
antidiscrimination contexts because they “decline[] to afford respect to
[transcendent] reasons.”39 The goal, he believes, is an attempt to reconstitute
the ancient Roman city to replace the Christian city—to ensure that political 
and social life is animated by an immanent religiosity that can provide a
sense of community to all citizens and not just the faithful.40 
Given its breadth and depth, Smith’s extended argument has made its 
way into the public debate, with Ross Douthat exploring Smith’s thesis
and its implications in an opinion piece in the New York Times titled The 
Return of Paganism.41 Picking up on one of the central themes of Smith’s
work, Douthat wonders whether the standard “secularization story” misses 
the mark and that civilization, instead of becoming increasingly secular, is 
in the process of creating a new form of religious life that combines paganism 
and civil religion into a post-Christian society.42  Smith, however, in exploring
this question, answers in the negative; he ultimately concludes that modern
paganism simply lacks the internal resources to generate the solidarity
necessary to build that sort of political community.43 
37. See id. at 111–12. 
38. Id.
39. Id. at 339. 
40.  See id. at 344–47, 353, 377–79. 





43. See SMITH, supra note 7, at 346–47. 
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And yet one of the challenging features of Smith’s narrative—indeed,
one that is replicated as his work has entered the public discourse—is that 
it marginalizes the role of Jews. This is not to say that Smith does not 
discuss Jews or Jewish thought on core matters; he certainly does and at
great length.44 Moreover, in reframing the culture wars as a clash between 
modern pagans and the Christian city, Smith does often place Jews within
the “Christian city”—at times, by referencing “devout Jews” as standing
alongside traditionalists.45 But, as argued by Richard Schragger and Micah 
Schwartzman in an article titled Jews Not Pagans, Smith’s dichotomy of 
Christians and pagans “erases Jews as having any distinct identity.”46 Like
the contemporary criticism of Orthodox Jewish institutions described above,
Schragger and Schwartzman worry that for Smith, Jews serve as simply a 
footnote to the Christian narrative on church-state questions, all-too often 
viewed synonymously with a Christian traditionalist agenda.47 
Accordingly, Schragger and Schwartzman argue that Smith’s dichotomy
is fundamentally flawed—and to see how, they point to the historical 
commitments of the American Jewish community as providing “a powerful 
counter-example.”48 Thus, “Jews are neither Christians nor pagans,”49 in that
they, on the one hand, “believe in a transcendent religious power”; yet, on 
the other hand, are not “Christians in Smith’s sense, at least not in the context 
of debates about religious freedom.”50 Indeed, when it has come to questions
of church-state separation, there has long been a strong impulse among
the most prominent American Jewish institutions to advocate for robust—
and at times, unyielding—separationism.51 As noted by Schragger and 
Schwartzman, “[i]t is true that American Jews sought to diminish state
support for Christianity, but their purpose was not to supplant Christianity
with immanent religion. After all, those Jews who opposed Sunday closing
laws, school prayer, and state support of religious schools were themselves
44. See, e.g., id. at 31–33 (quoting ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL, GOD IN SEARCH OF
MAN: A PHILOSOPHY OF JUDAISM 107, 119 (1966)) (discussing Rabbi Abraham Heschel’s 
understanding of the origin of religion); id. at 108–16 (comparing paganism to Christianity 
and Judaism).
45. Id. at 13, 248, 276 (referencing devout Jews as part of the traditionalist alliance). 
46. Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Jews, Not Pagans, 56 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 497, 505 (2019).
47.  Id. at 499, 505. 
48. Id. at 499. 
49. Id.
50.  Id. at 511, 512. 
51. See generally  GREGG IVERS, TO BUILD A WALL: AMERICAN JEWS AND THE 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1995).  Leo Pfeffer was perhaps the most well-known 
advocate of absolute separationism.  See id. at 28; JONATHAN D. SARNA & DAVID G. DALIN, 
RELIGION AND STATE IN THE AMERICAN JEWISH EXPERIENCE 233–34 (1997); see also LEO 
PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 149–80 (rev. ed. 1967). 
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believers in a transcendent God.”52 Ultimately, Jewish advocacy on behalf
of an absolutist version of separationism derived not from fidelity to modern
paganism but from the experience of minority status, religious oppression,
and political exclusion.53 
That Schragger and Schwartzman would object so vociferously to any
conflation of Jews with Christians is far from surprising. As a historical
matter, American Jewish institutions have long played an outsized role in 
church-state litigation, particularly with respect to debates over the meaning 
of the Establishment Clause. For example, from 1969 to 1989, the institutions 
related to the Jewish community filed more amicus briefs before the Supreme 
Court in church-state cases than any other faith community.54  Indeed,
during the mid to late twentieth century, Jewish organizations—in particular 
the American Jewish Congress under the leadership of renowned constitutional
scholar and lawyer Leo Pfeffer—likely impacted the course of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence more than any other organization.55  As noted in
1992 by Gregg Ivers, “[t]hat Jewish organizations intervene more often in
church-state litigation and find more resonance in the wall of separation 
metaphor than other religious denominations is consistent with the unparalleled
security that the constitutional principles of disestablishment has provided 
Jews in the United States.”56 As a result, to subsume Jews within a broader
traditionalist framework when it comes to questions of church and state
neglects the unique—and important—role of the American Jewish community 
in the evolution of legal doctrine surrounding such dilemmas.57 
52. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 46, at 513 (footnotes omitted). 
53. See NAOMI W. COHEN, JEWS IN CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE PURSUIT OF RELIGIOUS 
EQUALITY 128 (1992) (“Some Americans may not have understood the vehemence of the 
Jewish response to those church–state issues, but even in postwar America the memory of 
disabilities at the hands of Christian majorities could not easily be shrugged off.” (footnote 
omitted)); EUGENE J. LIPMAN & ALBERT VORSPAN, A TALE OF TEN CITIES: THE TRIPLE 
GHETTO IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIFE 278 (Eugene J. Lipman & Albert Vorspan eds., 2d 
prtg. 1962); SARNA & DALIN, supra note 51, at 1, 12–13, 16. 
54. See Gregg Ivers, Religious Organizations as Constitutional Litigants, 25 POLITY
243, 255–57 (1992). 
55. For a history of the remarkable impact of the “big three” of Jewish organizations—
the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, and the Anti-Defamation 
League—on the history of church-state separation, see generally supra note 51. 
56. Ivers, supra note 54, at 256. 
57. This is an ongoing endeavor. Indeed, there is no shortage of articles advising
American Jews how they ought to respond to religious-liberty developments and trends.  
See, e.g., Ryan Anderson & Daniel Mark, Jews, Christians, and the Future of Religious 
Liberty, MOSAIC (July 14, 2017), https://mosaicmagazine.com/picks/2017/07/jews-
christians-and-the-future-of-religious-liberty/ [https://perma.cc/DN8G-H9TH]; David E. 
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But while the history of American Jewish advocacy on behalf of 
disestablishment does provide an important correction to Smith’s thesis,
especially as it pertains to his discussion of contemporary controversies
surrounding religious displays,58 it does somewhat miss one of the central 
features of Smith’s argument. Smith is certainly aware that his overarching 
argument submerges some of the uniquely Jewish concerns in the clash
between pagans and the Christian city.59 However, his views of the culture
wars appear more driven by clashes over religious freedom—and specifically
the free exercise of religion—than disestablishment.60  As Smith notes,
“[t]he contemporary fight over religious freedom is one battleground—a 
central one, as it happens—in the larger and essentially religious struggle 
to define and constitute America.”61 
Thus, although Schragger and Schwartzman may have good reason to 
contest Smith’s dichotomy in principle—to use their words, to argue “[t]he 
choice of society is not binary: Christian or pagan? It is ternary: Christian
or pagan or Jew?”62—their secondary historical claim about the American 
Jewish experience is somewhat more fraught. In turn, to the extent they
hope to advance a historical claim—that the history of American Jewish
advocacy “provides a powerful counter-example”63 to Smith’s dichotomy,
thereby supporting the claim “Jews are not pagans, nor are they Christians . . .
Bernstein, How Anti-Discrimination Became a Religion, and What it Means for Judaism, 
MOSAIC (Aug. 8, 2016), https://mosaicmagazine.com/response/2016/08/how-anti-
discrimination-became-a-religion-and-what-it-means-for-judaism/ [https://perma.cc/V63A-
ZYNT]; Jay Michaelson, Trump’s ‘Religious Liberty’ Executive Order Should Scare the 
Bejesus out of Jews, FORWARD (May 4, 2017), https://forward.com/opinion/370998/religious-
liberty-executive-order-should-scare-jews/ [https://perma.cc/23KF-3V3H]. Admittedly, I
have written a few such articles myself. See Michael Helfand, In Colorado Cake Case, 
Religious Values Clash with Discrimination. Jews Have Been on Both Sides, N.Y. JEWISH
WEEK (Dec. 11, 2017, 12:51 PM), http://jewishweek.timesofisrael.com/jews-as-a-bridge-
on-religious-liberty/ [https://perma.cc/Z3MH-ETRD]; Michael A. Helfand, The Price of 
Pluralism, MOSAIC (Aug. 20, 2015), https://mosaicmagazine.com/response/2015/08/the-
price-of-pluralism/ [https://perma.cc/7YUR-R7GY].
58. See SMITH, supra note 7, at 267–82. 
59. See id. at 272 (“Religious minorities may, to be sure, feel like political ‘outsiders’ 
by virtue of their minority status, with the attendant political disadvantages and discomforts that 
minority status may sometimes entail.”); see also id. at 205–06 (“The depiction of 
Christianity in particular as intolerant, usually in cruder and less discriminating terms, is 
pervasive in Western culture. . . . These accusations have their historical bases.  There were of 
course the Crusades, and the inquisitions (and one critical reader urges that these should 
be mentioned more frequently and underscored in these pages).”). 
60. See id. at 304 (noting the chapter on “religious freedom” focuses primarily on
the second theme of “accommodation,” which “is often tied to [the First Amendment’s] free
exercise clause (‘. . . or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’).”).
61. Id. at 302–03. 
62. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 46, at 499. 
63. Id. 
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in the context of debates about religious freedom”64—their failure to consider
what the unique Jewish approach has, or approaches have, been to questions
of religious liberty and religious accommodation leaves us with an  
incomplete picture. That is, to what extent, when it has come to questions 
of religious liberty, has Smith’s dichotomy held true because the Jewish
voice aligned with Christian traditionalists? 
This is an important oversight given that clashes over religious liberty—
and in turn, religious accommodations—have, in many ways, been at the 
epicenter of the broader culture wars. As described above, because the 
culture wars have coincided with demographic and political shifts within 
the American Jewish community, much is at stake in identifying the, so 
to speak, Jewish take—or takes—on the religious accommodation project.
How has the American Jewish community responded to laws that impinge 
on religious practice and conduct? 
Identifying such a “Jewish take” is both a retrospective and prospective 
endeavor. It first requires recounting the historical approach of the American 
Jewish community: has the American Jewish community historically aligned 
itself on questions of religious accommodations with traditionalists—to use
Smith’s frame on matters of religious liberty, has the Jewish community
aligned itself with the Christian city? Or, alternatively, might we extend the 
contentions of Schragger and Schwartzman to the religious liberty context 
and conclude that the historical approach of the American Jewish community
represents a third way—neither Christian nor pagan—one that is both derived
from traditionalist commitments, but ultimately aligned with progressive
conclusions? 
And second, it requires diagnosing the current Jewish moment within the
culture wars. To what extent do current views among Jewish institutions 
and denominations align with, or deviate from, these historical approaches
to religious liberty? Do current debates over the nature of Jewish religious 
liberty advocacy—contentions that the trajectory of such advocacy efforts 
has been altered by the growing Orthodox Jewish demographic—represent a
new direction for how one of the prototypical American religious minority 
engages in controversies over the religious accommodation project?  Put
succinctly, what is the past of Jewish religious liberty advocacy—and how 
should that shape thinking over its present and future? 
Providing an answer to these questions is a significant historical undertaking.
The coming pages serve as a first step in such a project by exploring the 
64. Id. at 412. 
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history of Jewish institutional amicus curiae briefs—or amicus briefs—in
religious liberty litigation before the Supreme Court.65 Supreme Court rules
allow third parties to file a brief as an amicus curiae—friend of the Court— 
with the stated objective of such an option so as to “bring[] to the attention 
of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the
parties.”66 Although the first recorded appearance of an amicus brief before
the Supreme Court was in 1821,67 the use of such briefs has, in recent decades, 
exploded on the Supreme Court’s docket.68 Third parties increasingly use
such briefs to accomplish a range of objectives—with a range of audiences
in mind. Although organizations frequently draft amicus briefs in order 
to influence the Supreme Court and thereby alter the outcome of a case,69 
scholars have noted “the real audience for amicus briefs is [often] the 
membership of the group sponsoring the brief.”70 Thus, organizations can
benefit from credibility if cited by the Court, but they can also signal to 
their membership, by the mere act of filing a brief, their continued
dedication to the institution’s core mission and values.71 
65. See generally SARNA & DALIN, supra note 51, at 245–69 (describing the
growing criticism the 1950s and 1960s of the prevailing Jewish institutional approach to 
church-state separation); Jack Wertheimer, The Jewish Debate over State Aid to Religious 
Schools, in JEWS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE: DEBATING RELIGION AND REPUBLIC
217 (Alan Mittleman, Robert Licht & Jonathan D. Sarna eds., 2002).
66. SUP. CT. R. 37(1). 
67. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs 
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 744 n.1 (2000). For more on the history of
amicus briefs, see generally Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship
to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963). 
68.  Kearney & Merrill, supra note 67, at 752 (“The Court received some 4907 amicus 
briefs in the last decade (1986–1995), as opposed to 531 briefs in the first decade (1946– 
1955)—an increase of more than 800%.”); Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Research Note, 
Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation: An Appraisal of Hakman’s 
“Folklore,” 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 311, 315 (1982) (“[I]nterest group amicus participation 
in noncommercial cases before the Supreme Court was nearly nonexistent until World 
War II, that it rose significantly after the war, and that it then accelerated rapidly in the 
late 1960s and 1970s.”); see also Nathan Hakman, Lobbying the Supreme Court—An 
Appraisal of “Political Science Folklore,” 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 15, 26 (1966) (identifying 
only a modest increase in amicus brief filings between 1958 and 1964). 
69. See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr., Pamela C. Corley & Jesse Hamner, The Influence 
of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
917, 938 (2015); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of
Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
807, 808 (2004). 
70. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 67, at 824. 
71. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court
Era, 9 J.L. & POL. 639, 660 (1993) (noting the importance of “organizational maintenance,”
such as “keeping members satisfied,” to organizations’ decisions to file amicus briefs); 
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 67, at 825 (“Citation or quotation of a brief in the official
Reports of the United States Supreme Court can lend legitimacy to a group, and may be 
used by the group in its publicity efforts to create the impression that it has ‘access’ to or 
316
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Drawing conclusions from the history of amicus briefs filed by Jewish 
institutions before the Supreme Court in religious liberty cases has some 
drawbacks. First, individual institutions do not file briefs in each and 
every religious liberty case before the Supreme Court, leaving the record 
incomplete at times. Second, limiting our purview to religious liberty cases 
is itself somewhat fraught; the two religion clauses are often intertwined 
in complicated ways, and therefore, only focusing on Free Exercise cases
does not provide a full picture.72 Third, amicus briefs, by their nature as 
documents of legal advocacy, take—at least to some extent—the law at
any point in time as given; thus, using them to identify historical trends
and evolutions can be difficult, given that filing organizations are always
updating the manner in which they press their claims based upon changes 
in legal doctrine.  And fourth, amicus briefs are certainly only a small piece
of the historical record capturing how the American Jewish community
approached questions of religious liberty. A full history would certainly
involve mining other sources to develop a broader historical record, including 
amicus briefs in lower court cases. 
That being said, the impressive frequency with which numerous Jewish 
institutions have filed briefs in free exercise cases before the Court—combined 
with the significant number of Jewish institutions that have historically
taken advantage of this option to intervene in Supreme Court litigation—
create a relatively robust historical record. Accordingly, Jewish institutional 
amicus briefs provide an important first cut documenting and tracking what 
positions some of the leading Jewish institutions have taken in response 
to the ebb and flow of religious liberty doctrine.73  And in this way, amicus
briefs sketch the beginnings of a picture for the trajectory of Jewish religious 
liberty advocacy—highlighting the American Jewish community’s historical 
commitment to religious accommodations and how that historical commitment
has been challenged by the dilemmas at the heart of the current culture wars.
All told, these amicus briefs before the Supreme Court paint a picture 
of three broad stages of Jewish institutional responses to religious liberty 
cases.  In the first stage, discussed in Part II and spanning the early 1960s
‘influence’ with the Court. Interest groups can use this impression to obtain new members 
and contributions. Even if the group’s briefs are never cited, the brief can be distributed
to members and others as evidence that the group’s leadership is diligently pursuing its
members’ interests in high places.  No doubt emulation enters into the picture here as well.”). 
72. See generally COHEN, supra note 53; IVERS, supra note 51; SARNA & DALIN,
supra note 51. 
73. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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through the late 1970s, Jewish institutions manifested broad consensus
over religious liberty and support for religious accommodations.  In  so  
doing, Jewish institutions filed briefs supporting the conventional doctrinal
framework—the one applicable in the pre-Employment Division v. Smith
era74—that protects against government substantially burdening religious
exercise unless doing so is the least restrictive means for advancing 
a compelling government interest.75 In the second stage, discussed in Part
III, Jewish institutions largely retained consensus over these fundamentals 
of free exercise doctrine, but they began to splinter over how to apply
limiting principles to free exercise claims. Thus, during the period from 
the late 1970s through the late 1990s, some Jewish institutions, while 
almost uniformly supporting claims asserting the existence of a burden on
religious exercise, began to also support limitations on religious liberty flowing 
from external constraints, such as either Establishment Clause concerns
or the compelling nature of implicated government interests.76 Accordingly,
Jewish institutions continued to experience broad consensus over the applicable
legal framework for evaluating religious liberty claims; however, institutional
dissensus grew with respect to where to draw the line at the outer limits 
of the doctrine. 
In the third and current stage, discussed in Part IV, Jewish institutions 
begin, largely for the first time, to file briefs challenging the very existence 
of religious liberty claims or the sufficiency of religious burdens. Indeed, 
beginning at the tail end of the 1990s, as part of the broader culture wars,
some Jewish institutions start to not only propose limitations on free exercise 
rights, but they question whether certain claims are sufficient to trigger a 
religious liberty right in the first place.77 And these seeds of dissensus
come into full bloom in the twenty-first century’s second decade, as the
Supreme Court begins to hear religious liberty cases implicating the rights 
of women and the LGBT community. Indeed, by the time the cases at the 
heart of recent religious liberty controversies—such as Hosanna-Tabor 
74. See infra Section IV.A.  I use the term conventional throughout this article to
describe the substantial burden framework simply because it was the doctrinal framework
embraced by the Court during much of the time period covered by this article.  To be sure,
scholars have long debated the substantial burden framework’s historical record. See, e.g., 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious 
Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 571 (1998); Michael W. McConnell, 
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120–28 
(1990); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1420 (1990); Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free
Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REV. 117, 134–35 (1993). I take no position here on this
debate. 
75. See infra Part II. 
76. See infra Part III. 
77. See infra Part IV.
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Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,78 Hobby Lobby,79 Zubik
v. Burwell,80 and Masterpiece Cakeshop81—make their way to the Supreme
Court, Jewish institutional consensus has all but dissipated. Moreover, 
this current dissensus over the very viability of religious liberty claims now
exists not only between progressive and traditionalist Jewish institutions, 
to use Hunter’s dichotomy,82 but also among traditionalist institutions
themselves. 
This overall trajectory indicates that views on religious liberty within 
the American Jewish community originally aligned, to again use Hunter’s
contemporary categories, with views associated with traditionalists.83 However,
over time, many Jewish institutions—particularly those with more progressive
leanings—have been increasingly willing to challenge not only the limits 
on religious liberty but also on the viability of certain categories of religious 
liberty claims themselves.84 As a result, dissensus among Jewish institutions
has grown greater with each passing phase.85 Moreover, although this shift 
is taking place primarily among more historically progressive organizations, 
some traditionalist institutions are also following this trend;86 accordingly, 
some more modest degree of dissensus has begun to creep in among 
traditionalist institutions as well.87 In sum, this overall trajectory makes 
it difficult to think of Jewish institutions as having, in their initial phases,
provided a third way with respect to religious liberty. However, as Jewish
institutions—encountering the increasingly complex and multifaceted
religious liberty claims of the culture wars—have migrated towards more
progressive views on religious liberty, the possibility that Jewish institutions 
might in fact embrace something akin to a third way—one that is, to use 
Schragger and Schwartzman’s phrase, “neither Christian nor pagan”88— 
has become more and more likely.
To be certain, these conclusions are by their nature somewhat tenuous.  
The stakes in religious liberty cases across time—as well as the nature of 
78.  565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
79.  134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
80.  136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
81. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
82. See HUNTER, supra note 1, at 46. 
83. See infra pp. 345–46. 
84. See infra Section IV.B.
85. See infra Section IV.B.
86. See infra text accompanying note 345. 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 19–25. 
88. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 46, at 510. 
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the relevant interests in each case—somewhat resist comparison.  Indeed,
the religious liberty story over the past half century has been typified by
evolution; settled positions have become unsettled as the law has responded 
to new challenges and questions.89 Thus, using Hunter’s traditionalist-
progressive frame—with all its intentionally contemporary baggage—is 
itself somewhat of an anachronism.90 Still, the contemporary debates over 
where Jewish religious liberty advocacy has come from and where it is 
headed—both in the academy and among the general public—have looked to 
the past of such advocacy to interpret the present moment. And in response
to some of those arguments, interrogating Jewish institutional amicus
briefs before the Supreme Court helps identify a trajectory of these advocacy 
efforts, providing an important starting point for telling the story of Jews
and the culture wars. In so doing, it serves as a point of departure for 
determining whether American Jewish advocacy around religious liberty 
has been historically aligned with our contemporary categories of progressives
or traditionalists—or, whether it has represented a third way that is neither 
Christian nor pagan. 
II. JEWS AND THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CONSENSUS
Attempting to identify the dominant Jewish approach to questions of
religious liberty is an inherently fraught endeavor, and certainly no article 
can capture the entirety of this rich and complex story. Indeed, much has 
already been written with respect to the history of Jewish engagement
with questions revolving around the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, including attendant questions of church-state separation.91 
This is far from surprising given that American Jewish institutions played 
a pivotal role in litigation around such issues in the mid to late twentieth
century, influencing the trajectory of Establishment Clause doctrine for 
decades.92 
At the same time, scholars have spent less time evaluating how these
same Jewish institutions intervened in litigation over the Free Exercise  
Clause—cases that deal more directly with religious liberty issues.93  This
89. For a discussion of some of the central evolutions and inversions in the religious 
liberty story, see infra Section IV.A.
90. A complete picture of how these categories have played out in the religious 
liberty context would entail a similar study on the evolution of advocacy within other interested 
groups and, in particular, with the broader American Christian community.  However, that 
investigation is beyond the scope of this more limited project. 
91. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 53; IVERS, supra note 51, at 205–06; SARNA & DALIN,
supra note 53, at 1. 
92. See COHEN, supra note 53, at 123–30; IVERS, supra note 51, at 66–188. 
93. To be sure, separating between Free Exercise and Establishment Clause cases
is no easy task.  In the words of Leo Pfeffer, “there is rarely a case involving one of 
320
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is true even as the amicus briefs filed before the Supreme Court provide a
useful and ready window into how Jewish institutions approached religious 
liberty questions. Indeed, one of the interesting features of American Jewish 
institutional intervention in religious liberty questions is the relative
consensus around religious liberty issues that persisted until the very end 
of the twentieth century—at least in contrast to the complexities that typified 
internal Jewish debates over issues of separationism. 
The intervention of Jewish institutions in Supreme Court church-state
litigation through the public filing of amicus briefs is somewhat recent, 
becoming prolific in the 1940s.94 Scholars and advocates have often divided
the Jewish institutions that frequently advocated through amicus briefs 
into the broad, even if imperfect, categories of “secular” and “religious.”95 
The primary secular organizations filing briefs before the Court, often referred
to as the “big three,” included the American Jewish Congress (AJCongress), 
the American Jewish Committee (AJCommittee), and the Anti-Defamation
League (ADL).96 Although the three organizations, all founded in the early
twentieth century, initially served as “social service agencies” for Jews,
they evolved over the mid-twentieth century “into powerful ethnic defense
organizations determined to vindicate their civil rights through all available 
vehicles of organized advocacy.”97 
Another important amicus participant has been the Jewish Council for
Public Affairs (JCPA)—a national umbrella organization for “125 local
Jewish Community Relations Councils, and 16 national Jewish agencies.”98 
Originally called the National Community Relations Advisory Council 
(NCRAC), it changed its name in 1971 to the National Jewish Community 
Relations Advisory Council, finally switching to the JCPA in 1997.99  The
JCPA currently describes its mandate as “to advance the interests of the 
Jewish people; support Israel’s quest for peace and security; to promote a 
the Religion Clauses that does not at the same time involve the other.” Leo Pfeffer, Amici 
in Church-State Litigation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 94 (1981). 
94. Id. at 84–85. 
95. Id. at 84–86; see also COHEN, supra note 53, at 126–27 (describing the trend of 
secularization within the big three as the organizations professionalized). 
96. COHEN, supra note 53, at 123; see also IVERS, supra note 51, at 34–65. 
97. IVERS, supra note 51, at 64. 
98. Mission and History, JEWISH COUNCIL FOR PUB. AFF., http://www.jewishpublic 
affairs.org/about-jcpa/mission-and-history/ [https://perma.cc/V3SQ-TPDS].
99. Id.; see also J.J. GOLDBERG, JEWISH POWER: INSIDE THE AMERICAN JEWISH 
ESTABLISHMENT, at xiii (1996). 
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just American society; and advocate for Human Rights around the world.”100 
Finally, the National Council for Jewish Women (NCJW), founded in 
1893,101 has also participated in a number of religious liberty amicus briefs.102 
Describing itself as the “first and most progressive Jewish women’s
organization in the United States,” the NCJW characterizes its historical
mission as “dedicated to improving the quality of life for women, children, 
and families, and to safeguarding individual rights and freedoms both in
the U.S. and Israel.”103 
In terms of “religious” Jewish organizations, frequent amicus brief 
contributors have historically included the Synagogue Council of America,104 
which was an interdenominational umbrella of the congregational and 
rabbinic arms of the Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox streams, and 
ultimately disbanded in 1994;105 the Central Conference of American Rabbis
(CCAR),106 which serves as the primary voice of the Reform Jewish rabbinate
and aims to, among other goals, “[a]mplif[y] the voice of the Reform Rabbinate 
in the Reform Movement, the Jewish community, and the world in which
we live”;107 the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations (OU)108—the 
umbrella organization of centrist American Orthodox Judaism—which 
maintains an advocacy center that serves at “the non-partisan public policy
arm of the nation’s largest Orthodox Jewish organization‚ representing 
nearly 1,000 congregations nationwide, and leads the OU’s advocacy
efforts in Washington, DC, and state capitals”;109 the Union for Reform
Judaism (URJ), previously referred to as the Union of American Hebrew
Congregations,110 which serves as “the umbrella organization for North 
American Reform Judaism” that includes over nine hundred congregations—
100. Mission and History, supra note 98. 
101. FAITH ROGOW, GONE TO ANOTHER MEETING: THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH
WOMEN, 1893–1993, at 2 (1993).  For a general history of the NCJW, see id. 
102. IVERS, supra note 51, at 177. 
103. About Us, NAT’L COUNCIL JEWISH WOMEN, https://www.ncjw.org/about/ [https:// 
perma.cc/TS65-VURZ].
104. Pfeffer, supra note 93, at 84–85. 
105. Jonathan J. Golden, From Cooperation to Confrontation: The Rise and Fall of 
the Synagogue Council of America (May 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis 
University) (on file with Center for Jewish History).  For a history of the Synagogue Council of 
America, see id. 
106. IVERS, supra note 51, at 177. 
107. Mission Statement, CENT. CONFERENCE AM. RABBIS (Jan. 17, 2008), https://www.
ccarnet.org/about-us/mission-statement/ [https://perma.cc/7XT9-QZ3X].
108. See Archive of Court Involvement, ORTHODOX UNION ADVOC. CTR., https://
advocacy.ou.org/issue/in-the-courts/ [https://perma.cc/B48W-345W]. 
109. About the OU, ORTHODOX UNION, https://www.ou.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/ 
97VD-CZQR].
110. Reform Judaism Group Decides to Update Name, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2003, 
at B8. 
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with over one million affiliated members—in the United States and Canada;111 
the Rabbinical Council of America (RCA), an Orthodox rabbinical organization 
affiliated with the OU;112 and the Jewish Committee on Law and Public
Affairs (COLPA),113 an organization founded in 1965 to “defend the interests
of Orthodox Jews in church-state matters.”114 
Although these organizations have long disagreed over how the American 
Jewish community ought to debate questions of disestablishment and 
separationism,115 their official positions from the 1960s through the early
1990s—as captured in amicus briefs before the Supreme Court—largely 
demonstrated significant consensus over the proper approach to religious
liberty.116 The earliest manifestation before the Supreme Court of this
consensus dates back to the twin Sunday Closing Law cases of 1961— 
Braunfeld v. Brown117 and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc.118 
Both cases considered the claims of Orthodox Jewish merchants who
argued that Sunday-closing laws were unconstitutional under the religion
clauses of the First Amendment.119 These twin cases implicated both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.120 As a result, much 
of the dissensus that animated Jewish institutional views on the best way
to approach questions of separationism manifested itself in the Sunday 
Closing Law cases.121 
111. The Reform Movement in North America, UNION FOR REFORM JUDAISM, https://
urj.org/reform-movement [https://perma.cc/T6BY-6K5S].
112. About Us, RABBINICAL COUNCIL AM., http://www.rabbis.org/about-us/ [https:// 
perma.cc/RJD5-33DK].
113. David G. Dalin, Jewish Critics of Strict Separationism, in JEWS AND THE AMERICAN 
PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 65, at 291, 298. 
114. SARNA & DALIN, supra note 51, at 261; see also COLPA, The Legal Arm of
Observant Jewry, JEWISH L., http://www.jlaw.com/LawPolicy/colpa.html [https://perma.cc/
W4PD-9GZ4] (describing itself as the “Legal Arm of Observant Jewry,” and stating it
“has been responsible for the enactment of over twenty major pieces of federal and state
legislation and scores of amendments and administrative regulations which have dramatically
improved the ‘quality of life’ for observant Jews throughout the United States”).
115. See, e.g., SARNA & DALIN, supra note 51, at 47; Dalin, supra note 113; see also
supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
116. Naomi W. Cohen, An Overview of American Jewish Defense, in JEWS AND THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 65, at 13, 39–40, 42.
117.  366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
118.  366 U.S. 617 (1961). 
119. Id. at 618, 622; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 600–01. 
120. Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 618; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 600–01. 
121. See COHEN, supra note 53, at 214–28 (describing division over whether Jewish
institutions should advocate for the wholesale rejection of Sunday Closing Laws as violating
323




     
 
   
 
     
  
   
   
      
      
   
 
    
  
   







   
   
  
           
 
   
  







Notwithstanding those divisions, Jewish institutions were united in their 
view that Sunday Closing Laws violated the Free Exercise Clause by placing
Sabbath-observing merchants at a “serious economic disadvantage,” 
because, in keeping with Jewish law, they already closed their stores on
Saturday.122  Thus, the amicus brief jointly submitted by the NCRAC and 
the SCA—the two large umbrella organizations of American Jewry representing
both secular and religious institutions—emphasized in the statement of
interest that “[e]nforcement of compulsory Sunday observance laws
against them constitutes, in our view, a serious infringement of their civil,
religious and economic rights and imposes a heavy burden upon their 
adherence to their religious beliefs.”123 Following up on this opening salvo, 
the brief argued that Sunday Closing Laws violated the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment because “[r]equiring such a person to abstain from 
engaging in his trade or business two days each week whereas his Sunday 
observing competitor is required to abstain only one day a week obviously
imposes upon the former a competitive disadvantage and thus penalizes
him for adhering to his religious beliefs.”124 Importantly, this remained 
true even though the claimed burden was indirect: 
Nor, we submit, is it material that the economic sanction is indirect rather
than direct . . . . The decisions of this Court make no distinction between indirect 
and direct economic sanctions on the exercise of a right guaranteed by the First 
Amendment, so long as the causal connection is clear.125 
Similarly, the amicus  brief submitted by the AJCommittee and ADL
argued that Sunday Closing Laws violated the religion clauses—both of 
which had, as their ultimate purpose, “to assure religious freedom.”126 
Although the joint AJCommittee and ADL brief focused on the disestablishment 
concern presented by the Sunday Closing Laws, it also characterized such
laws as tantamount to economic coercion: A Sunday Closing Law “also
places an economic penalty upon Jews and upon those Christian denominations
that observe Saturday as the Sabbath, to the prejudice of the latter groups.”127 
the Establishment Clause or whether they should pursue the more modest objective of
simply seeking religious exemptions from such laws). 
122. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 602. 
123. Brief for Synagogue Council of America & National Community Relations 
Advisory Council as Amici Curiae at 4, Gallagher, 366 U.S. 617 (No. 11), 1960 WL 
98548, at *4. 
124. Id. at 25. 
125. Id. at 27. 
126. Brief for American Jewish Committee & Anti-Defamation League of B’nai 
B’rith as Amici Curiae at 30, Gallagher, 366 U.S. 617 (No. 11), 1960 WL 98549, at *30 
[hereinafter Brief for AJCommittee & ADL].
127. Id. at 33. 
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The Supreme Court rejected the claim, explaining that the laws did not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause because they simply made the Sabbatarian
“religious beliefs more expensive.”128 That being said, the Court also
noted in passing that government may not impose an incidental and indirect 
burden on religious conduct where “the State may accomplish its purpose 
by means which do not impose such a burden,”129 a comment that ultimately
morphed into the broader protections afforded religious conduct in subsequent 
Supreme Court cases.130 
Indeed, in the next Free Exercise case before the Supreme Court, Sherbert 
v. Verner,131 Jewish organizations were again unified in their support of
the Free Exercise claim at stake. In Sherbert, the Supreme Court addressed 
the claims of a South Carolina Seventh-day Adventist who, having been 
terminated for refusing to work on Saturday, was denied unemployment
benefits.132  Sherbert argued that withholding her unemployment benefits
on account of her refusal to work on her Sabbath constituted a violation
of her Free Exercise rights.133 
Jewish groups, not surprisingly, agreed. The ADL and the AJCommittee, 
along with the ACLU, filed an amicus brief declaring that they “believe[d] 
that freedom of religion is a basic right of every American and that it must
be defended against all attempts at abridgment.”134 Accordingly, the brief
outlined how the denial of unemployment benefits violated the Free Exercise
Clause:
Appellant, because of her religious beliefs, was deprived of a statutory right
and economic benefit, available generally to citizens of South Carolina.
That imposed an economic disadvantage upon her solely because of her religious
convictions and her conduct in accordance with such convictions. Thus, as in the 
cases involving taxes on the exercise of religious beliefs, the individual is 
128. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961). 
129. Id. at 607. 
130. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 937–42 (1989) (describing the origins of the 
substantial burden standard in free exercise doctrine). 
131.  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
132. Id. at 398. 
133. Brief for the Appellant at 21–22, Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (No. 526), 1963 WL
105527, at *21–22. 
134. Brief of the American Jewish Committee et al. Amici Curiae at 4, Sherbert, 374 
U.S. 398 (No. 526), 1963 WL 105530, at *4 [hereinafter AJCommittee Brief Sherbert].
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disadvantaged because he suffers a monetary loss imposed on him solely because 
of his religion.135  
This same approach was also at the center of the brief filed jointly by 
the AJCongress, the SCA, the Jewish Labor Committee, and the Jewish War
Veterans: “A statute which is construed to disqualify from unemployment
insurance benefits one who because of his religious convictions does not
labor on Saturdays deprives him of free exercise of his religion.”136 Moreover,
the fact that the burden was, in some manner of speaking, indirect should
not change the Court’s analysis:
Only in the narrowest and most unrealistic sense can it be said that the State of
South Carolina is not forcing the appellant to violate her Sabbath. An unemployed 
worker, without a source of livelihood, can hardly be said to be exercising full
freedom of choice. While the compulsion may be indirect, it is quite substantial.137 
The Court ultimately agreed, holding that a law may not impose an “incidental 
burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion,” unless the burden can
be justified by a “compelling state interest,” thereby making the substantial-
burden standard an explicit centerpiece of its Free Exercise doctrine.138 
Many Jewish groups similarly lined up to support claims for religious 
accommodation in the Court’s next landmark religious liberty case, Wisconsin
v. Yoder.139 In Yoder, the Court addressed whether Wisconsin’s compulsory
education law infringed on the free exercise rights of Amish parents who, 
in accordance with their religious beliefs, refused to send their children to
public school beyond eighth grade.140  Filing an amicus brief supporting
Yoder, the SCA and the AJCongress expressed their “strong interest in 
religious freedom and in a religiously and culturally pluralistic America.”141 
Accordingly, they endorsed the religious accommodation approach outlined 
in Sherbert, arguing that:
The applicable principle in resolving the clash of competing interests in these 
cases is based upon a recognition that the freedoms secured by the First Amendment 
are our most precious heritage as a nation. It is because of this recognition that,
when our courts consider the validity of legislation regulating rights secured by
135. Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). 
136. Brief of Synagogue Council of America et al. as Amici Curiae at 6, Sherbert, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (No. 526), 1963 WL 105529, at *6. 
137. Id. at 7.  It is worth noting that in their jointly filed brief, the AJCommittee and
ADL argued that the claims of burden in Sherbert were more direct than the claims in 
Braunfeld, thereby encouraging the Court to uphold the former even though it had rejected
the latter. See AJCommittee Brief Sherbert, supra note 134, at 19. 
138. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
139.  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
140. Id. at 207. 
141. Brief Amici Curiae of the Synagogue Council of America et al. at 2, Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (No. 70-110), 1971 WL 126412, at *2 [hereinafter SCA Brief Yoder].
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the Amendment, they do not apply the usual strong presumption of constitutionality 
applicable to other types of legislation.142 
Similarly, COLPA filed an amicus brief, encouraging the court to adopt 
Sherbert’s compelling government interest test and to conclude that 
the government’s interest in Yoder was insufficient to support application
of Wisconsin’s compulsory education law against the Amish.143  Indeed,
COLPA’s amicus brief expressed an underlying worry that government 
regulation of minority religious practices often stemmed from an undercurrent
of religious discrimination: “We believe that it is important, at this time
in the nation’s history, that this Court reaffirm that principle [of religious 
liberty] and thereby stem an alarming and ever-increasing tide of private 
and governmental hostility to, and discrimination against, religious 
noncomformists.”144 
Thus, all Jewish organizations filing amicus briefs in Yoder lined up in
favor of granting a constitutionally mandated religious accommodation, 
arguing that no compelling government interest existed to justify the burden
imposed by Wisconsin’s compulsory education law.145 The court ultimately 
agreed, concluding “[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality
if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”146 
In this way, Jewish advocacy in the few landmark free exercise cases of 
the 1960s and 1970s highlighted the collective commitment to the 
accommodationist project—that is, a commitment to protecting against
substantial burdens on religious exercise in the absence of a compelling 
government interest. Indeed, it was a communal commitment to the 
importance of “religious and culturally pluralistic”147 America that led  
American that had to be “defended against all attempts at abridgment.”148 
In so doing, these organizations embraced a doctrinal framework that
protected government burdens on religious exercise even where those 
burdens were somewhat indirect.  They encouraged the Court to override 
such burdens only where the government could demonstrate the existence 
142. Id. at 9. 
143. Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public Affairs, Amicus
Curiae at 4–5, Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (No. 70-110), 1971 WL 126414, at *4–5. 
144. Id. at 2. 
145. See supra notes 141–44. 
146. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963)). 
147. SCA Brief Yoder, supra note 141. 
148. AJCommittee Brief Sherbert, supra note 134. 
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of some compelling government interest for doing so—a threshold these
organizations, at least in the cases presented, refused to concede the
government had met.149 In turn, Jewish institutions, to support this overall
framework for addressing religious liberty claims, filed amicus briefs both
in cases that implicated the religious practices of the Jewish community
as well as in cases that implicated the religious practices of other faith 
communities to support this overall framework for addressing claims
of religious liberty. 
III. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY DISSENSUS, PHASE I: EMPLOYMENT LAW AND 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION NORMS 
The story of Jewish institutional advocacy in cases like Braunfeld, 
Gallagher, Sherbert, and Yoder is in many ways far from surprising. As
a religious community—and a minority religious community at that— 
Jewish organizations viewed Free Exercise rights as essential to ensuring that
the Jewish community’s religious practices would have constitutional
protection from majoritarian laws. In this way, Jewish institutions initially 
entered religious liberty cases as enthusiastic supporters of the religious
accommodationist project, advocating for government to protect the religious 
practices of all faith communities. In so doing, they strongly supported
application of the conventional substantial-burden framework, which prohibited
government from imposing substantial burdens on religious exercise absent
a sufficiently compelling justification.150  In the 1960s and 1970s, this uniform
response found ready supporters across the Jewish institutional landscape.
Nevertheless, cases did not remain quite so simple. In the 1980s, the 
accommodationist agenda began clashing with another important commitment 
of the American Jewish community—the commitment to antidiscrimination 
laws or, more broadly, antidiscrimination norms.151  The American Jewish
community—or certainly its more liberal denominations—had long been
committed to the enactment and implementation of far more robust 
antidiscrimination laws in the United States.152 Indeed, the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act itself was drafted in the conference room of the Reform Movement’s 
Religious Action Center.153 
149. See id. at 16; SCA Brief Yoder, supra note 141, at 10–11. 
150. See, e.g., SCA Brief, Yoder, supra note 141, at 10–11. 
151. See infra Sections III.A–B. 
152. See ALBERT VORSPAN & DAVID SAPERSTEIN, JEWISH DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE: TOUGH MORAL CHOICES OF OUR TIME 204–05 (1998); James F. Findlay, Religion 
and Politics in the Sixties: The Churches and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 77 J. AM. HIST. 
66, 66–67, 67 n.3, 68 (1990). 
153. VORSPAN & SAPERSTEIN, supra note 152, at 205. 
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This outsized role is far from surprising given the levels of discrimination 
encountered by Jews prior to the enactment of federal civil rights laws. For
example, according to a 1957 study, nearly 23% of resort hotels discriminated
against Jews;154 and a number of employment surveys from the 1950s
determined that rates of religious discrimination against Jews hovered around
20%.155 As a result, although American Jewish institutions were unanimous 
in their endorsement of the religious accommodation project, they were
far more conflicted about how to respond to cases where religious individuals 
and groups sought religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws and 
religious accommodations in the face of antidiscrimination norms. Ultimately,
such cases brought two overarching commitments into conflict, complicating 
the otherwise cemented consensus over the religious accommodationist
project. And this ambivalence, maybe not surprisingly, was particularly
manifest in Supreme Court litigation related to various forms of employment 
benefits and discrimination.
In this first phase of communal dissensus, division between Jewish 
organizations over religious liberty claims before the Supreme Court fell 
into two categories. The first related to whether broad statutory exemptions
intended to protect religious practice or observance violated the Establishment
Clause by providing impermissible benefits on the basis of religion. The
second related to balancing the claims of religious liberty against other 
important government interests, including antidiscrimination norms. However,
without diminishing the importance and impact of this first phase of dissensus,
there was minimal division among Jewish organizations beyond these two
categories. Absent extreme Establishment Clause worries and concerns over
the government’s ability to promote its compelling interest in antidiscrimination
norms, Jewish organizations retained a broad consensus over the religious 
accommodation project from the late 1970s through the end of the twentieth
century. 
154. Anti-Jewish Discrimination in American Hotels Declines Sharply, JEWISH 
TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY DAILY NEWS BULL., Jan. 31, 1964, at 2.
155. Lois Waldman, Employment Discrimination Against Jews in the United States—1955, 
18 JEWISH SOC. STUD. 208, 211 (1956). Interestingly, some worried that these forms 
of discrimination also arose within the Jewish community. See, e.g., Charles S. Liebman,
Orthodoxy in American Jewish Life, 66 AM. JEWISH Y.B. 21, 91 (1965) (“Many Orthodox 
Jews have been personally as well as intellectually and emotionally alienated from the 
non-Orthodox world through employment discrimination. Instances of observant Jews 
who have been denied employment in Jewish federation-supported institutions or national 
Jewish organizations because they are Sabbath and holiday observers are legion.”).
329
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A. Religious Liberty and Establishment Clause Constraints in 
Employment Law 
The first Supreme Court case that raised questions about the relationship
between religious accommodation and employment discrimination garnered 
a high degree of consensus within the American Jewish community. In 
1977, the Supreme Court addressed Trans World Airlines v. Hardison—a 
case of an employee, Larry Hardison, who claimed Trans World Airlines 
(TWA) violated his rights under Title VII for failing to accommodate his 
religious observance of the Sabbath.156 TWA responded on multiple fronts,
first arguing that its failure to accommodate Hardison was simply the result 
of following the collectively-bargained seniority system for selecting work
shifts and that its failure to circumvent that seniority system did not constitute
impermissible religious discrimination.157 
TWA, however, did not stop there. It then argued that the religious
accommodation requirement of Title VII violated the neutrality demanded
by the Establishment Clause.158 Such an argument had the potential to
find a ready home within the halls of American Jewish organizations who 
had long pressed Establishment Clause arguments before the Supreme
Court.159 Yet, at least in this early stage, an extraordinarily broad range 
of Jewish organizations—including the AJCommittee, AJCongress, ADL, 
and the official rabbinic organizations of Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox 
Judaism—joined an amicus brief, emphatically contesting TWA’s
Establishment Clause challenge and doing so on two fronts.160 The first 
argument focused on the core of the Establishment Clause inquiry, arguing
that the religious accommodation provision of Title VII had a secular
purpose, did not advance or inhibit religion, and did not require excessive
government entanglement with religion.161 
That argument, however, was followed by a second that emphasized the 
Free Exercise Clause. The brief contended that under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, Congress had the authority to enact the religious accommodation 
provision of Title VII to “carry out the provisions of the Free Exercise  
Clause.”162  In making this argument, the brief leveraged prior free  
exercise case law, such as Sherbert and Yoder, and then emphasized that 
156.  432 U.S. 63, 66–69 (1977). 
157. Brief for Petitioner Trans World Airlines, Inc. at 25–29, TWA, 432 U.S. 63 (No. 
75-1126), 1977 WL 189766, at *25–29. 
158. Id. at 19–20. 
159. See supra Part II.
160. See generally Brief of Central Conference of American Rabbis et al., Amici
Curiae, TWA, 432 U.S. 63 (No. 75-1126), 1977 WL 189779. 
161. See id. at 8–23. 
162. Id. at 23–29. 
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America’s long-standing commitment to religious freedom demanded that 
the Court allow Congress to ensure religious employees would receive
accommodation of their practices: “[T]his Court in the case at bar must 
protect respondent Hardison from the needless requirement of choosing 
between gainful employment and following the religious dictates of his
conscience. To do less would be to deny the principle of religious liberty 
which drew the earliest settlers to our shores.”163 
Tracking similar themes, COLPA filed a brief on behalf of a number of 
Orthodox Jewish organizations,164 and, by special leave of the Court, also 
represented these groups at oral argument.165 In so doing, it argued that
by providing “[s]pecial protection for religious liberty,” Title VII did not 
violate the Establishment Clause because “Congress act[ed] reasonably to
shield religion and those who practice it from the effects of governmental 
or private action that would, absent such legislation, have the effect of  
infringing religious belief or practice.”166 
The Court’s holding ultimately refrained from striking down the religious 
accommodation provisions of Title VII on Establishment Clause grounds.167 
However, the Court did find in favor of TWA on other grounds and 
concluded that Title VII did not require circumventing the existing 
seniority system, which would have placed more than a de minimis burden 
on TWA.168 As the Court explained, “[T]o give Hardison Saturdays off,
TWA would have had to deprive another employee of his shift preference 
at least in part because he did not adhere to a religion that observed the
Saturday Sabbath. Title VII does not contemplate such unequal treatment.”169 
At this point, with respect to Establishment Clause limitations on religious 
163. Id. at 28–29. 
164. See generally Brief for the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public
Affairs (“COLPA”) as Amicus Curiae, TWA, 432 U.S. 63 (No. 75-1126), 1977 WL 189774
(representing the Agudath Israel of America, National Council of Young Israel, Rabbinical
Council of America, and Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America) [hereinafter
COLPA Brief TWA].
165. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, TWA, 432 U.S. 63 (No. 75-1126) (noting 
appearance and argument of COLPA attorney Nathan Lewin). For more on this history,
see Nathan Lewin, Will the Supreme Court Finally Protect the Right Not to Work on the 
Sabbath?, TABLET (Feb. 26, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-
and-politics/281122/the-right-not-to-work-on-the-sabbath [https://perma.cc/WLP5-BXKY].
166. COLPA Brief TWA, supra note 164, at 19–20 (emphasis omitted). 
167. See generally TWA, 432 U.S. 63.
168. Id. at 84. 
169. Id. at 81. 
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accommodations, the Court and Jewish institutional advocates remained
largely aligned.170 
But the American Jewish consensus on how to address religious claims
for accommodation within the prevailing Title VII framework would soon 
begin to splinter around the edges of the doctrine. In the 1985 case, Estate 
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed an Establishment 
Clause challenge to a Connecticut statute, which provided, in part, that 
“[n]o person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as 
his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day.  An
employee’s refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for 
his dismissal.”171  In contrast to its decision in Hardison, the Court embraced
this Establishment Clause argument, concluding the “absolute and unqualified 
right” granted by the statute “imposes on employers and employees an absolute
duty to conform” to the asserted religious observances and that “[t]his
unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests
[had] a primary effect that impermissibly advances a particular religious 
practice.”172 
This “unyielding” quality of the statute was not only central to the Court’s 
opinion,173 but it also, even if ever so slightly, split the response of American 
Jewish institutions. Attorneys from both COLPA and the AJCongress
represented the petitioner in the case, arguing for the constitutionality of
the statute.174 The  ADL filed an amicus brief supporting Connecticut’s
statute, concluding that it not only satisfied the requirements of the Establishment 
Clause’s Lemon test—having a secular purpose, neither advancing nor
inhibiting religion, and lacking excessive entanglement—but that, like in 
Hardison, the statute was justified on account of the state’s “legitimate 
interest in protecting the free exercise rights of its citizens.”175  By contrast,
the AJCommittee, filing a brief jointly with the ACLU, struck a more
ambivalent tone, describing the case as addressing a “sensitive and difficult 
170. To be sure, the Court appeared to reach this holding by concluding that Title
VII’s religious exemption only required employers to absorb de minimis burdens. See, e.g., 
Lewin, supra note 165. By adopting this standard, the Court put itself at odds with some
Jewish institutions, which believed that Title VII required employers meet the more demanding
“undue hardship” standard as per the text of the statute.  Id. 
171. 472 U.S. 703, 706 (1985) (quoting CONN. GEN STAT. § 53-303e(b) (1985)). 
172.  Id. at 709–10. 
173. Id. at 710. 
174. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-
1158), 1984 WL 566029 (including as attorneys for petitioner Nathan Lewin as well as Dennis
Rapps of the Commission on Land and Public Affairs and Marc Stern of the American Jewish
Congress).
175. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith at 4–5, 
Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566046, at *4–5 [hereinafter
ADL Brief Thornton].
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issue.”176 Although the brief argued that the Court should reverse the
lower court’s decision finding that the statute violated the Establishment
Clause, it also encouraged the Court to remand the case for additional factual
findings and conceded that, contrary to the religious accommodation 
requirements at issue in Hardison, “an absolute statutory command that a 
private employer defer to the religious interests of employees regardless
of the cost to the employer or consequences to other employees would be
capable of unconstitutional applications under both the Establishment and
Due Process Clauses.”177 
Divisions among American Jewish institutions became even more 
pronounced when the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
§ 702 of Title VII, which granted an exemption to religious organizations 
from the general prohibition against employment discrimination on the 
basis of religion.178 The particular case, Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, involved 
the termination of an employee, Arthur Mayson, from the Deseret Gymnasium, 
a nonprofit facility, open to the public and run under the auspices of
entities associated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.179 
The grounds for Mayson’s termination were his failure to secure a “temple 
recommend, that is, a certificate that he is a member of the Church and
eligible to attend its temples.”180 When Mayson filed suit, alleging impermissible
employment discrimination on the basis of religion, his former employer
asserted that it was shielded by § 702 of Title VII, which excluded from 
liability any “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or 
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion 
to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”181  And in 
response, Mayson contended that § 702, if applied to allow religious employers 
to assert religious grounds for discrimination in hiring for even nonreligious
jobs, would violate the Establishment Clause.182 
176. The American Civil Liberties Union & the American Jewish Committee for
Leave to File a Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Estate of Thornton, 472
U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566040, at *4 [hereinafter AJC Motion]. 
177.  Id. at 5, 7. 
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1998 & Supp. V 1994). 
179.  483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987). 
180. Id.
181. Id. at 329 n.1 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78
Stat. 241, 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1)). 
182. Id. at 331. 
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The Court rejected the Establishment Clause challenge in Amos,183 but 
Jewish institutions were divided on whether this was the appropriate outcome.
On the one hand, COLPA and the AJCongress rejected the claim that the 
exemption from Title VII afforded to religious institutions violated the 
Establishment Clause.184 In reaching this conclusion, both COLPA and 
the AJCongress focused on the relevance of the Free Exercise Clause for 
analyzing Establishment Clause violations.185  Thus, the AJCongress explained: 
The Constitution prohibits not only the reality of government support for religion,
but also the appearance of such support. However, in evaluating whether the 
appearance of endorsement exists, it is necessary to bear in mind the values that 
the Free Exercise Clause protects. . . . The American political tradition recognizes
that the quid pro quo of the ban on establishments of religion is the relative 
freedom of churches from regulation. Church exemptions are quite common in
American law for just this reason.186 
Similarly, COLPA argued that “[t]he Establishment Clause permits Congress 
to protect the free exercise of religion by granting statutory exemptions 
that provide ‘breathing space’ to religious institutions.”187 
However, the ADL disagreed, concluding that § 702 of Title VII “has 
the primary effect of advancing religion and thereby fail[ed]” under the 
Lemon test.188 In taking a stand against a statutory exemption for religious
institutions, the ADL’s brief stands out for two reasons. First, the brief
relies on the Court’s “unyielding weighting” argument in Estate of Thornton189— 
an argument the ADL had rejected in the amicus brief it filed in Estate of
Thornton only a few years prior.190 Second, the ADL’s brief, in arguing
183. Id. at 337. 
184. See generally Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public 
Affairs (“COLPA”) as Amicus Curiae, Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (Nos. 86-179, 86-401), 1987 
WL 864782 [hereinafter COLPA Brief Amos]; Brief of the American Jewish Congress as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Amos, 483 U.S. 327 ( Nos. 86-179, 86-401), 1987 
WL 864772 [hereinafter AJCongress Brief Amos].
185. Compare COLPA Brief Amos, supra note 184, at 4, with AJCongress Brief Amos, 
supra note 184, at 32–33. 
186. AJCongress Brief Amos, supra note 184, at xiii–xiv (emphasis omitted).
187. COLPA Brief Amos, supra note 184, at 4.
188. Brief of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellees at 3, Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (Nos. 86-179, 86-401), 1987 WL 864783, 
at *3 [hereinafter ADL Brief Amos].  The ADL was not the only Jewish institution to
support Mayson. See generally Brief of the Women’s Legal Defense Fund et al., Amici 
Curiae, Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (Nos. 86-179, 86-401), 1987 WL 864786 (similarly arguing 
§ 702 violated the Establishment Clause and joined by the National Council for Jewish
Women).
189. ADL Brief Amos, supra note 188, at 6.
190. See ADL Brief Thornton, supra note 175, at 2 (“We believe that legislative 
attempts to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs of all citizens are in accord with 
the principles of religious freedom upon which this nation was founded and are consistent 
with the strictures of the religious clauses of the First Amendment.”). 
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in favor of striking down § 702, spent significant effort identifying robust
statutory and constitutional protections available to religious institutions, 
thereby attempting to allay concerns that striking down § 702 would leave 
religious institutions open to significant exposure for liability under Title 
VII.191 
On the statutory side, the ADL argued that even without § 702, Title 
VII shielded religious organizations from liability when terminating employees
on religious grounds, so long as those religious grounds represented a bona
fide occupational qualification.192 Moreover, according to the ADL, Title
VII was not, even as a statutory matter, intended to “apply to the relationship 
between a church and its ministers or minister-like personnel.”193 As a  
result, the ADL concluded: 
Title VII does not apply to discrimination by a religious organization within two
of its most important spheres of religious activity—the hiring and supervision of
ministers and minister-like employees, and the operation of religious schools— 
or in any setting where the religion of an employee is a bona fide occupational 
qualification.194 
The ADL, however, did not stop there. In outlining the protections afforded 
to religious institutions with respect to religious-based employment, the
ADL argued that the Free Exercise Clause provided broad protections as well,
noting that the Supreme Court had “long barred governmental attempts to 
interfere with religious doctrine or internal church affairs.”195 Combining
those protections with other First Amendment protections would “provide 
a potent defense for any religious organization when a Title VII claim 
threatens to interfere with its fundamental religious liberty to establish 
doctrine, provide religious education, choose its ministers, or manage its
internal religious affairs.”196 Furthermore, claimants faced with the requirements
of Title VII could also avail themselves of standard free exercise protections 
“if that regulation threatens to create a burden upon the conscientious 
exercise of religious duty,”197 given that a “religious organization may assert 
a claim for free exercise exemption on behalf of its individual members . . .
191. ADL Brief Amos, supra note 188, at 14, 17.
192.  Id. at 14–15. 
193.  Id. at 15. 
194.  Id. 
195.  Id. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. at 16. 
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or on the basis of its own rights.”198  Therefore, in the main, religious
institutions concerned about the prospects of the Court striking down
§ 702 on Establishment Clause grounds did not have to worry; they could 
leverage free exercise protections to ensure that employment decisions 
made on religious grounds were largely insulated from the legal liability
otherwise present under Title VII. 
That being said, the ADL viewed none of these free exercise protections
as relevant given the facts of Amos. Terminating Mayson, “a gymnasium
building engineer,” could be justified neither by the prohibition “barring 
interference in the relationship between a church and its ministers or 
minister-like employees” nor by an assertion that religion was “a bona
fide occupational qualification.”199 Moreover, because Mayson’s duties 
were “purely secular” and the gymnasium’s activities neither included any
“religious ritual” nor any attempt to “teach[] or spread[] the Mormon Church’s
religious beliefs or practices,” the ADL concluded that no free exercise 
protections were relevant.200 Indeed, the complete absence of religious 
responsibilities or religious activities led the ADL to conclude that
denying the applicability of free exercise protections did not require the 
court to impermissibly “inject itself into the Church’s internal affairs,” or 
“interfere[] in any way with the religious doctrine or internal affairs of the
Church.”201 Thus, the ADL concluded, Mayson’s suit should proceed
uninhibited by statutory or constitutional bars to liability.202 
The ADL’s brief in Amos represents the outer boundary of Jewish
institutional dissensus in this second phase of Jewish advocacy around
religious liberty before the Court. And yet even in taking this relatively 
aggressive stance encouraging the Court to strike down employment 
protections for religious institutions, the ADL still affirmed robust protections 
when it came to conduct and activity more central to the mission of religious 
institutions. Moreover, this gentle shift away from a full-throated defense 
of religious exemptions in employment law—likely triggered by increasingly 
complex cases related to the relative burdens borne in clashes between 
employment discrimination and religious observance—did not undermine 
the underlying consensus over the constitutionality of religious accommodation 
more broadly. Indeed, during this very time period, Jewish institutions 
remained unanimous in cases that largely tracked the original facts of
198. Id. at 16 n.8 (citations omitted) (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of
Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985)). 
199. Id. at 17. 
200. Id. at 18. 
201. Id. at 18–19. 
202. Id. at 21. 
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Sherbert.203 Thus, in the 1987 case Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission,204 the ADL, AJCommittee, and AJCongress sided with the
Appellant, concluding the state’s failure to provide unemployment benefits 
violated the Free Exercise Clause—and that providing an exemption from
the standard rules governing unemployment benefits did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.205 
Similarly, in Thomas v. Review Board,206 the AJCongress stated
disqualification of the petitioner from unemployment benefits violated the 
Free Exercise Clause, emphasizing that—like in Sherbert—“[w]hile the 
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement of free exercise rights is
nonetheless substantial.”207 And, because “it is justified by no compelling 
state interest, it violates the First Amendment.”208  The Jewish Peace 
Fellowship, the only other Jewish organization to file a brief in Thomas, 
advanced a parallel argument.209 Authored by Leo Pfeffer, the brief argued
“[a] statute which is construed to disqualify from unemployment insurance 
benefits one who because of his religious convictions will not engage in 
the manufacture of arms deprives him of free exercise of his religion.”210 
And in Smith,211 the AJCongress—the only Jewish organization to file
a brief in that case—once again advanced this familiar free exercise argument,
arguing that, absent proof of a compelling government interest, denial of 
employment benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause.212 Explaining its
particular interest in the case, the AJCongress reiterated its core mission: 
203.  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
204.  480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
205. See Brief of the American Jewish Congress et al., Amici Curiae at 6–7, Hobbie, 
480 U.S. 136 (No. 85-993), 1986 WL 727638, at *6–7; Brief of Baptist Joint Committee 
on Public Affairs et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 5–6, Hobbie, 480 U.S. 
136 (No. 85-993), 1986 WL 727633, at *5–6. 
206.  450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
207. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for American Jewish
Congress, Amicus Curiae at 6, Thomas, 450 U.S. 707 (No. 79-952), 1980 WL 339248, at *6. 
208. Id. (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398). 
209. See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief of Jewish Peace 
Fellowship & Fellowship of Reconciliation, Amici Curiae at 3–4 Thomas, 450 U.S. 707 
(No. 79-952), 1980 WL 339252, at *3–4. 
210. Id. at 3.
211.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
212. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Jewish Congress in Support 
of Respondents, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213), 1989 WL 1126849. 
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As an organization representing a religious minority, AJCongress is concerned
that the power of government not be used arbitrarily to suppress easily accommodated
free exercise of religion. In particular, AJCongress seeks to ensure that the religious
practices of minority religions are not burdened or prohibited absent compelling
justification.213 
B. Religious Liberty and Clashes with Compelling 
Government Interests 
Jewish institutional responses to Supreme Court religious liberty cases
in the 1980s outside the employment context followed a somewhat similar 
script.  On the one hand, consensus remained with respect to the fundamentals 
of the religious accommodation agenda—the importance of protecting
against substantial burdens on religious exercise in the absence of a compelling 
government interest. At the same time, Jewish institutional responses to
cases that raised questions about the scope of those protections received more 
varied reactions, with different organizations drawing the line in different
places. Ultimately, Jewish institutions did not harbor concerns with the 
fundamental objectives of the religious accommodationist agenda; instead, to
the extent they exhibited concerns, they flowed from the increasing number 
of instances where antidiscrimination norms tangled with claims for religious
exemptions or accommodations. 
The two best examples of this phenomenon may be two landmark religious
liberty cases from the 1980s: Bob Jones University v. United States214 and 
Goldman v. Weinberger.215 In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court addressed 
an IRS decision withdrawing tax-exempt status from Bob Jones University 
(BJU) on account of the university’s policy prohibiting interracial dating.216 
BJU argued withdrawal of their tax-exempt status violated its free exercise
rights—a claim the Supreme Court, in an 8–1 decision, ultimately rejected.217 
In the Court’s view, the government had an “overriding interest in eradicating 
racial discrimination in education” and “[t]hat governmental interest substantially
outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners’
exercise of their religious beliefs.”218 
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s near unanimity, Jewish organizations
were far more divided over the appropriate outcome. Both the ADL and
the AJCommittee sided with the IRS, arguing that revoking tax-exempt 
status did not violate the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause because
213. Id. at xiv.
214. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
215.  475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
216.  Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 580–81. 
217. See id. at 602–03. 
218. Id. at 604. 
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the government interest at stake was compelling.219 Thus, the ADL asserted 
that “the governmental interest in eradicating racial discrimination is among
the most compelling in our society today.”220 The AJCommittee, filing a
joint brief with the ACLU, pressed the argument even further, contending
that pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, there exists a “compelling,
constitutionally mandated national interest in eliminating all government 
support for race discrimination in all schools.”221 In turn, the existence of
this compelling government interest also outweighed any possible free 
exercise claim: “[T]he I.R.S. rule . . . must be upheld since the conduct at 
which it is aimed—government support of racially discriminatory schools—
poses uniquely substantial threats to our social fabric. The compelling 
national interest in eliminating such government support . . . has expressly
been held to override free exercise claims.”222 
COLPA, on the other hand, weighed in on the side of BJU, filing a brief
representing a wide range of Orthodox Jewish organizations.223 Although 
COLPA emphasized that racial discrimination in education violates Jewish 
religious principles, it nonetheless argued that withdrawing tax-exempt 
status because of an institution’s religious commitments and practices would 
violate the First Amendment: 
The purpose of the First Amendment is to protect minorities from the tyranny of
the majority. . . . Th[is] purpose of the First Amendment and its limitation on the 
powers of the majority would be frustrated if tax exemption and, with it, economic 
viability, could be granted to or withheld from the minority by the majority merely
because the minority, in pursuit of its religious rights, refuses to conform to the
219. Compare Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief for Anti-Defamation League
of B’nai B’rith, as Amicus Curiae, Bob Jones 461 U.S. 574 (Nos. 81-1, 81-3), 1982 U.S. 
S. Ct. LEXIS 1234 [hereinafter ADL Brief Bob Jones], with Brief of the American Civil
Liberties Union & the American Jewish Committee, Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance, 
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574 (Nos. 81-1, 81-3), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1239 [hereinafter
ACLU Brief Bob Jones].
220. ADL Brief Bob Jones, supra note 219, at *33. 
221. ACLU Brief Bob Jones, supra note 219, at 10 (emphasis omitted).
222. Id. at 42. 
223. See generally Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public
Affairs (COLPA) as Amicus Curiae, Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574 (No. 81–3, 81–1), 1981 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1357 [hereinafter COLPA Brief Bob Jones] (including Agudath Israel 
of America, National Council of Young Israel, Rabbinical Council of America, Torah
Umesorah, National Society of Hebrew Day Schools, and Union of Orthodox Jewish
Congregations of America). 
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social practices of the majority.  If the majority could so behave, the First Amendment 
would be meaningless.224  
Given the stakes, COLPA also concluded that no compelling government 
interest justified overriding Bob Jones’s free exercise rights because none 
of “the acts of the petitioners herein constituted crimes or otherwise violated
specific laws.”225 
Maybe the most noteworthy Jewish institutional reaction—or nonreaction—
to Bob Jones was the decision of the AJCongress not to file or join an
amicus brief. While typically it is difficult to read too much into the failure 
of an organization to file an amicus brief, Marc Stern, then a member of 
the legal staff of the AJCongress’s Commission on Law and Social Action
(CLSA), has described the internal decision-making calculus as follows: 
Our CLSA thought that Bob Jones was right [and] that the free exercise claim
was very strong. It was a very tangential form of race discrimination. But you 
could not take that position publicly. No way. We would have had some company in
that case that our leadership could not bear to keep.  So we stayed out.226 
Given its status as one of the most prominent institutional advocates in
church-state cases, the AJCongress’s reluctance to enter the fray is noteworthy,227 
highlighting the extent of Jewish institutional ambivalence surrounding
clashes between antidiscrimination norms and religious liberty.
While not particularly surprising, this split in Bob Jones stood in stark
contrast to Jewish institutional responses to Goldman.228  In Goldman, the 
Supreme Court addressed the free exercise claims of Simcha Goldman, an
Orthodox Jewish Air Force officer, who argued the Air Force had violated 
his free exercise rights by applying its regulation against the wearing of
headgear to prohibit him from wearing a yarmulke.229 Jewish organizations
all lined up to support Goldman, each arguing that the military lacked a 
compelling government interest to justify abridging the free exercise rights at
stake. COLPA served as part of the legal team representing Goldman.230 
In its amicus brief, the AJCommittee argued:
224. Id. at *6–7. 
225. Id. at *9. 
226. IVERS, supra note 51, at 205–06 (quoting Marc D. Stern). 
227.  See COHEN, supra note 53, at 125 (describing how the AJCongress, by the mid-
twentieth century, had cultivated a reputation for “rashness—the eagerness . . . to hold forth 
publicly on sensitive issues and its uncompromising defense of strict separationism”).
228.  475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
229. Id. at 504. 
230. See generally Brief for the Petitioner, Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (No. 84-1097),
1985 WL 669072 (including Dennis Rapps of COLPA as well as Nathan Lewin and David 
Butler, as attorneys for Goldman). 
340
HELFAND FINAL TO PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/2019 11:12 AM      
 
     
  
         
    
    
    
     
       
 
    
  
 
       
 
   
   
 
    
  
   
 
   
     
 
   
 
         
       
      
          
 
   
    
[VOL. 56: 305, 2019] Jews and the Culture Wars 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
On the facts of this case, in which the wearing of a yarmulke was unchallenged
for several years, the military’s interest in enforcement of its regulations, merely
for the sake of enforcement, does not constitute a state interest of the necessary 
magnitude to justify abridgment of a serviceman’s free exercise rights.”231 
The ADL struck a similar note, focusing on the Court’s past precedent: 
The free exercise cases, in short, convincingly testify to the weighty concerns 
implicated when government impinges on matters of religious conscience. There
can be no doubt that, in the civilian context, petitioner’s right to wear a yarmulke— a
religious article obviously posing no threat to public safety, peace or order—could not
be proscribed or subjected to regulation.232 
The AJCongress and the SCA—along with the ACLU—joined the 
institutional chorus supporting Goldman, filing a joint brief that described
the broader issue at stake as “whether an Orthodox Jew who wishes to 
serve his country is unwelcome in the Air Force.”233 In turn, the brief focused 
on the “unbroken line of cases” reaffirming “that government may burden
religious liberty only when such a burden ‘is essential to accomplish an
overriding governmental interest,’” a requirement amici believed was wholly
unsatisfied given the facts of the case.234 
There is no doubt the particular Jewish interest at stake in Goldman, as 
opposed to that in Bob Jones, played an important role in the uniformly
supportive Jewish institutional response to the free exercise claim—a 
position ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court, which deferred to the Air 
Force’s judgment that the important values of military hierarchy imparted
by uniform dress constituted sufficient justification to override Goldman’s
claims.235 That being said, the doctrinal distinction by and large embraced 
by Jewish institutions in both cases focused on the very different government
interests at stake in the two cases. For the most part, Jewish institutions 
231. Brief of the American Jewish Committee & Christian Legal Society as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (No. 84-1097), 1985 WL
669068, at *2. 
232. Brief of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith as Amicus Curiae at 9,
Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (No. 84-1097), 1985 WL 669070, at *9 (citation omitted). 
233. Brief of American Jewish Congress et al. Amici Curiae at 3,  Goldman, 475
U.S. 503 (No. 84-1097), 1985 WL 669074, at *3 [hereinafter AJCongress Brief Goldman].
234. Id. at 12 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982)). 
235. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509–10. To be sure, in 1987, Congress—adopting 
legislation drafted by Goldman’s attorney, Nathan Lewin of COLPA—modified the 
military’s dress code to largely permit the wearing of a yarmulke.  See 10 U.S.C. § 774(a) 
(2012) (“Except as provided under subsection (b), a member of the armed forces may wear 
an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform of the member’s armed force.”); 
SARNA & DALIN, supra note 51, at 279. 
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that supported the free exercise claim in Goldman viewed the military’s 
interest as far weaker than the IRS’s interest in eradicating racial discrimination 
in higher education.236 The AJCommittee captured this difference in a
footnote of its amicus brief in Goldman, which explained the government 
retains the right to override religious liberty claims where “the conduct in 
question assaults one of the most fundamental bedrock values of our society or
legal order” and cited Bob Jones as an example.237 
In this way, Jewish institutional responses in the 1980s did not attack 
the fundamental building blocks of religious accommodation doctrine.  
All told, Jewish institutions adopted the conventional framework where 
substantial burdens on religious exercise could only be justified by narrowly
tailored laws that advanced a compelling government interest. Moreover, 
in the main, they did not challenge free exercise claims on the ground that 
the petitioner failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of a substantial
burden on religious exercise; instead, they differed over where to draw the 
line given differing views of what ought to qualify as a compelling government 
interest. 
Accordingly, in other 1980s free exercise cases, where governmental 
claims for the existence of compelling government interest were relatively 
weak or nonexistent, Jewish institutions lined up in support of religious
liberty claimants.  Examples include the AJCongress’s brief in McDaniel 
v. Paty238—signed along with numerous other organizations—which argued 
Tennessee’s constitution prohibiting ministers seats in the state legislature 
violated the Free Exercise Clause.239 Similarly, in O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabbazz,240 the AJCongress and SCA filed a brief supporting the free exercise 
claim of Muslim inmates, arguing that the conventional substantial burden
framework should be applied to the prison’s failure to permit attendance 
at Jumu’ah—a Friday afternoon congregational service.241 And the brief
filed by the AJCongress and the NJCRAC in Hernandez v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue242 supported the Church of Scientology’s claim that 
denying tax deductions for participating in “auditing” sessions, intended to 
236. See, e.g., Brief of the American Jewish Committee & Christian Legal Society 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5 n.2, Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (No. 84-1097), 
1985 WL 669068, at *5 n.2. 
237. Id. (citing Bob Jones, 460 U.S. 574 (1983)). 
238.  435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
239. Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief Amici Curiae of American Civil Liberties 
Union et al. at 2–5, McDaniel, 435 U.S. 618 (No. 76-1427), 1977 WL 189707, at *2–5. 
240.  482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
241. Brief Amici Curiae of the American Jewish Congress on Behalf of Itself & the 
Synagogue Council of America in Support of Respondents at 9–10, O’Lone, 482 U.S. 342 
(1987) (No. 85-1722), 1987 WL 880918, at *9–10. 
242. 
342
 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
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promote spiritual engagement and awareness, violated the Free Exercise 
Clause.243 In all these cases, Jewish institutions filing amicus briefs sided 
with religious liberty claimants, thereby promoting the application of the 
prevailing Free Exercise doctrine. 
Another noteworthy example of this ongoing consensus with respect to
the fundamental free exercise framework was the Jewish institutional response 
to Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n.244  In Lyng, the
Court addressed claims that government construction through a national 
forest would substantially burden the religion of three Native American
tribes who had been using the forest for religious purposes.245  The Court
rejected these claims, holding that, although “the challenged Government
action would interfere significantly with private persons’ abilit[ies] to
pursue spiritual fulfillment,” precedent demanded the Court reject the claim 
because “the affected individuals [were not] coerced by the Government’s 
action into violating their religious beliefs.”246 In so doing, the Court limited 
the protections of the Free Exercise Clause to cases where government 
regulations coerced individuals to act in a manner contrary to their faiths—a
shift that raised the dissent’s ire.247 
In their filings, Jewish institutions argued against this conclusion, emphasizing
both that the burdens in Lyng ought to qualify for free exercise protection 
and that the purported compelling government interest was insufficient to 
justify this incursion into the rights of those affected by the government’s 
conduct.248  The AJCongress filed an amicus brief encouraging the Court 
to decline the persistent attempts by the government to “water down the 
content of this compelling interest requirement” and also supporting the
substantial burden claim by emphasizing “that territory can be sanctified,
that places used by generations of believers for ritual purposes have special
243. Brief of the American Jewish Congress & the National Jewish Community
Relations Advisory Council as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 3–4, Hernandez, 
490 U.S. 680 (Nos. 87-963, 87-1616), 1988 WL 1025634, at *3–4. 
244. 
245.  Id. at 441–42. 
485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
246. Id. at 449. 
247. See id. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Ultimately, the Court’s coercion test 
turns on a distinction between governmental actions that compel affirmative conduct
inconsistent with religious belief, and those governmental actions that prevent conduct
consistent with religious belief. In my view, such a distinction is without constitutional
significance.”). 
248. See generally Brief Amici Curiae of American Jewish Congress, in Behalf of 
Itself & the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions, in Support of Respondents, Lyng, 485 
U.S. 439 (No. 86-1013), 1987 WL 880357 [hereinafter AJCongress Brief Lyng].
343
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holiness and special conduciveness for prayer”—all of which were threatened
by the government’s road-building plans.249 
And the AJCommittee also filed an amicus brief arguing the Free 
Exercise Clause protected “the right of traditional site-specific religious 
practices to . . . constitutional protection”—a right it believed had been
“already accorded to more mainstream beliefs.”250 In turn, the AJCommittee
reiterated that, under its view of the prevailing doctrine, the existence of
this free exercise right required the government to provide a compelling 
government interest to justify its actions, which it failed to do.251  In this
way, both the AJCongress and AJCommittee sought in Lyng to stave off 
both changes to the substantial burden doctrine and expansions of what
might qualify as a compelling government interest justifying a substantial
burden on religious exercise. 
The one exception to this overall trend prior to the more recent culture 
war cases comes from Bob Jones. Although the dominant theme of the 
briefs filed by the ADL and the AJCommittee focused on the government’s
compelling government interest in eradicating racial discrimination, both
included secondary or tertiary arguments that focused on the quality of the
burden on religious exercise. For example, towards the end of its amicus
brief, the ADL noted that the IRS’s withdrawal of tax-exempt status did 
“not directly prohibit the actual practices of religious beliefs, as would a
statute banning polygamy. Petitioners remain free to teach their doctrines 
about the separation of the races. Their members individually may still conduct 
their private affairs in a manner consistent with the teachings of their
religion.”252 Although this argument initially appears to take issue with
the degree of the burden experienced by BJU, a full view of the ADL’s
argument makes clear that it largely avoids casting doubt on whether the
religious exercise in question was deserving of protection. Instead, the
argument ultimately focuses on the limited theological burden imposed by
the government not to question whether the burden was sufficiently substantial 
but to support the conclusion that the IRS had employed the least-
restrictive means in response to the BJU policy.253 Thus, the brief argued,
“terminating the grant of tax benefits to petitioners is the least restrictive
249. Id. at *xiii, *23. 
250. Brief of the Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 3, Lyng, 485 U.S. 439 (No. 86-1013), 1987 WL 880357, at *3 [hereinafter Christian Legal 
Society Brief Lyng]. 
251. Id. at *13–16. 
252. Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief for Anti-Defamation League of B’nai 
B’rith as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 34, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1, 81-3), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1234, at *34. 
253. See id.
344
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way in which the government could end its involvement with practices 
that it could not constitutionally engage in itself.”254 
By contrast, the AJCommittee’s brief in Bob Jones did contest the very 
existence of a substantial burden. The AJCommittee argued that the IRS’s
withdrawal of tax-exempt status, “[i]n stark contrast with cases where this
Court has sustained free exercise claims,” did not involve “the outright
governmental ban on any religious belief or practice, nor the requirement 
that, in order to receive a government benefit, petitioners abandon any 
religious belief or practice.”255 In supporting this claim, the AJCommittee
emphasized “the I.R.S. rule d[id] not directly compel petitioners, under threat
of criminal or civil sanctions, to embrace any repugnant religious belief 
or to abandon any religiously motivated practice.”256 In making this claim,
the AJCommittee characterized the university’s religious claims somewhat 
narrowly. In its view, BJU was only committed “to eschew[ing] interracial 
marriages and dating relationships; [it] d[id] not assert any religious duty 
to shun racially integrated schools.”257 By narrowly cabining BJU’s asserted 
“religious duty,” the AJCommittee argued the IRS’s determination had 
not, in fact, burdened religious exercise.258 Although this claim had less
to do with a narrow construction of what qualifies for the legal category 
of a burden—it focused more on the factual assertion of BJU—the
AJCommittee’s brief in Bob Jones is noteworthy in its willingness to
challenge a religious liberty claim based on the nature of the burden on 
religious exercise.259 In so doing, the AJCommittee stepped beyond what
other Jewish institutions were willing to argue—at least in the first phase
of Jewish institutional dissensus over religious liberty. 
IV. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY DISSENSUS, PHASE II:
THE CONTEMPORARY CULTURE WARS 
We began our exploration of Jewish institutional advocacy before the
Court by wondering whether we could speak coherently about a Jewish view 
on religious liberty, and whether that view aligned with Hunter’s contemporary
254. Id.
255. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union & the American Jewish Committee,
Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 35–36, Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574 (Nos. 81-1, 81-
3) (footnotes omitted).
256. Id. at 36. 
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categories of traditionalists and progressives.260 Identifying the content
and trajectory of Jewish religious liberty amicus briefs could shed light on
whether Jewish institutions had provided a third way that, to use Schragger 
and Schwartzman’s phrase, was neither pagan nor Christian in the same
way as they had when it came to the Establishment Clause.261  In this way,
the story of Jewish amicus briefs may help determine to what extent, when
it came to questions of religious liberty, Jews aligned themselves with—
or were outsiders to—Smith’s image of the Christian city. 
As described above, in the 1960s and 1970s, Jewish institutions took largely
traditionalist approaches to free exercise doctrine, embracing the substantial 
burden framework for analyzing religious liberty claims.  These early views
were therefore far from idiosyncratic, falling in line with standard conceptions 
of traditionalist approaches to religious liberty. Indeed, such views would
find a ready home in Smith’s Christian city. 
In the 1980s, Jewish institutions responded to increasingly complex
religious liberty claims—claims that implicated countervailing Establishment
Clause and antidiscrimination concerns—that led to the beginning of 
dissensus on the outer boundaries of religious liberty doctrine.  But while
the Court’s decisions during the 1980s—in the face of these increasing 
complexities—zigged and zagged in somewhat unpredictable ways,262 the
basics of Jewish institutional amicus responses remained, by and large, 
consistent, supporting the basic doctrinal framework with disagreement
reserved for the margins of application. Indeed, in this first phase of dissensus,
Jewish institutions rarely, if ever, pushed back at the core of religious liberty 
doctrine, continuing to support the same substantial burden framework as 
they had in the 1960s and 1970s. Accordingly, they consistently supported
the viability of religious liberty claims and the existence of prima facie
religious liberty rights, veering from full-throated support only where they 
believed countervailing concerns required line-drawing at the outskirts of 
the doctrine. 
The prevailing doctrinal consensus, however, would not last as Jewish
institutions began responding to religious liberty controversies at the heart
of the culture wars. While the transformation from predominant consensus
to dissensus would not begin until the tail end of the 1990s—and then only 
appear in amicus briefs before the Court yet another decade later—the seeds
of division were sown with the Supreme Court’s landmark 1990 decision 
in Smith.263 In contrast to prior cases, the Court held that the denial of
260. See supra Part I. 
261. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 46, at 510. 
262. See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value 
of Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 556–63 (2015). 
263.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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claimants’ unemployment benefits was not entitled to constitutional protection 
under the Free Exercise Clause.264 Instead, the Court held that the Free 
Exercise Clause only protects against laws that target or discriminate against
religion.265 More precisely, the Free Exercise Clause does not provide any
protection against “neutral” and “generally applicable” laws with legitimate 
secular objectives and only unintentionally burden religion.266 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause represented 
a departure from prior Supreme Court precedent.267 The free exercise doctrine
prior to Smith, embraced by Jewish institutions in their amicus briefs,268 
afforded far broader religious liberty protections and required courts to
grant exemptions from laws that substantially burdened religiously motivated
conduct unless applying the law was necessary to achieve a compelling 
government interest.269  In Smith, the Court discarded this more protective 
framework, only providing constitutional protection against laws that
targeted religiously motivated conduct.270 In turn, this doctrinal shift began
a long process of legal evolution from Smith, to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), and then to the current debates at the heart of the 
contemporary culture wars.
A. RFRA, RLUIPA, and the Origins of the New Jewish Dissensus 
Although in Smith the Court eliminated the constitutional requirement
to provide exemptions for incidental burdens on religious exercise, it still
believed it had left those seeking religious accommodations with a viable
alternative: namely, petitioning the legislature.271 Thus, those seeking 
exemptions could still look to their legislature to incorporate a religious
exemption into the relevant law. This alternative legislative strategy, however, 
provided cold comfort to critics of Smith. Petitioning a legislature might 
264. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 878. 
267. For commentary soon after the Smith decision, see generally William P. Marshall,
In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991); Michael 
W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 
(1990).
268. See supra Parts II–III. 
269. See generally, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
270. See Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Wish Granting and the Property Rights 
Genie, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 7, 45 (1996).
271.  See 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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serve as a viable alternative for more well-established and better-organized 
religious communities, but minority religious communities would be far 
less likely to secure the legislative exemptions necessary to protect their 
less familiar religious practices from legal burdens.272 
These worries formed the primary catalyst behind the RFRA,273 which
aimed, as a matter of federal legislation, to undo Smith and restore the prior
applicable free exercise standard. Enacted into law in 1993, RFRA prohibits
laws that substantially burden a person’s religious exercise, unless imposing
272. See id. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court today suggests that the
disfavoring of minority religions is an ‘unavoidable consequence’ under our system of
government and that accommodation of such religions must be left to the political process.  
In my view, however, the First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of 
those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with 
hostility. The history of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact 
majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups such as the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Amish.” (citation omitted)).
273. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4), invalidated in part by
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Religious Freedom Restoration 
348
Act of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights 
on the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 22 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing on RFRA]
(statement of Rep. Lamar Smith, Texas) (“The free exercise of religion is one right that 
separates a free nation from a totalitarian, suppressive regime.  For over 40 years we have 
condemned communist countries for their official atheism and persecution of religious 
minorities and, in fact, during World War II we fought to end the Holocaust. We have to 
practice what we preach.”); id. at 34 (statement of Reverend Dean M. Kelley, Counselor 
on Religious Liberty, National Council of Churches) (“It is only the unconventional 
practices of minorities and nonconforming individuals that put the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights to the test. And now the court has abandoned the very test it had long enunciated 
to protect the free exercise of religion.”). The secondary literature is replete with criticism
of Smith highlighting the particular challenges to religious minorities. See, e.g., Kent
Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 145, 155 (2004) (“The 
rule of Smith risks legislative indifference to the plight of unfamiliar minority religions.”); 
Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV. 221, 224 
(“Formally neutral laws can lead to persecution for a simple reason: Once government 
demands that religious minorities conform their behavior to secular standards, there is no 
logical stopping point to that demand. Conscientious resistance by religious minorities 
sometimes inspires respectful tolerance and exemptions, but sometimes it inspires religious
hatred and determined, systematic efforts to suppress the religious minority.”); McConnell, 
supra note 267, at 1132 (“Prior to Smith, the Free Exercise Clause functioned as a corrective 
for th[e] bias [against minority religions], allowing the courts, which are institutionally
more attuned to the interests of the less powerful segments of society, to extend to minority
religions the same degree of solicitude that more mainstream religions are able to attain through 
the political process. The Free Exercise Clause, prior to Smith, was an equalizer.”); Steven 
H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 
32 (2004) (“The Smith case thus reeks of insensitivity to the plight of a religious minority.”); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 216 (1992) 
(describing the “big flaw” of Smith as “entrench[ing] patterns of de facto discrimination against 
minority religions”). 
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that burden is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.274 
Given that religious minorities are comprised of a relatively small number 
of adherents and therefore are less likely to successfully petition a legislature,275 
it is far from surprising that numerous Jewish organizations joined the 
Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion that supported RFRA legislation. 
This united a wide-range of Jewish organizations under the Coalition’s
umbrella, ultimately including Agudath Israel of America, AJCommittee,
AJCongress, ADL, Central Conference of American Rabbis, Council of
Jewish Federations, Federation of Reconstructionist Congregations and 
Havurot, National Council for Jewish Women, COLPA, RCA, OU, Union 
of American Hebrew Congregations, and United Synagogue of Conservative
Judaism.276 In a statement submitted to the House of Representatives’ 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, the American Jewish
Congress emphasized this concern for religious minorities post-Smith: 
Some may question why federal legislation to undo Smith is considered so essential.
But that is to underestimate the role of courts in protecting religious minorities.
. . . [W]ithout a legal basis for a religious claim, religious adherents have no
protection against the most capricious acts of government. All religious minorities
must be alarmed when the courts are stripped of the power to require government
to accommodate those religious practices, to use Justice Scalia’s words, “not
widely engaged in.”277 
Additionally, the Anti-Defamation League’s statement similarly noted that,
because of Smith, “an individual can no longer rely on the free exercise 
clause to exempt a religious practice . . . under any law a state may pass 
unless that law expressly targets a specific religious practice. . . . The potential 
implications of this decision for general religious practice in this country
274. RFRA § 3.
275. Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty and Religious 
Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 359 (2010) (“[S]tatutes burdening small religious minorities 
are disproportionately likely to be uniform ones, immune to challenge under the Smith rule 
[because] [s]mall religious minorities often want idiosyncratic things—they demand rights 
that no one else wants.  As a result of their nonmainstream beliefs, they are often burdened 
by laws that burden no one else.  Because no significantly sized group is burdened, 
no exceptions to the law ever develop.” (footnote omitted)). 
276. Hearing on RFRA, supra note 273, at 61 (statement of the Coalition for Free 
Exercise of Religion); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 n.9 (1994). 
277. Hearing on RFRA, supra note 273, at 66–67 (statement of the American Jewish 
Congress) (emphasis added). 
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are significant and disturbing.”278 This consensus as to the troubling— 
and potentially devastating—consequences of Smith ultimately led to RFRA’s 
enactment.279 
This continued consensus spilled over into the amicus briefs filed by 
Jewish institutions. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Cityof Hialeah280— 
the first post-Smith free exercise case before the Court—Jewish groups 
lined up to support the petitioners with near unanimity.281 The petitioners
were members of a Santerian church who claimed that the City of Hialeah
had issued discriminatory regulations prohibiting their ritual sacrifice of
animals.282 The AJCongress, AJCommittee, and ADL all signed on to a brief
that argued the regulations in question violated the Free Exercise Clause
“because they [were] specifically directed at a religious practice.”283  And
the brief, while not expressly asking the Court to overturn its decision in 
Smith, did state “religious and civil liberties communities, across the 
spectrum of theological and political opinion, are united in the conviction
that Smith was wrongly decided.”284 Specifically, these groups argued 
that Smith “radically diminished the substantive liberty of each American
to worship in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his
own conscience, subject only to the overriding responsibility of the state
to maintain public peace and safety.”285 
Similarly, COLPA filed a brief on behalf of numerous Orthodox Jewish
organizations—including the Agudath Israel, OU, and RCA—arguing that
the city’s regulation violated the Free Exercise Clause even under the new 
Smith standard because the regulations were “directed against religious 
practice.”286 The brief then expressed broader worries about how Smith 
“elevate[d] form over substance,” noting that “[h]ad Hialeah more cleverly 
drafted its Resolutions and Ordinances . . . its legislation could have passed 
constitutional muster under Smith.”287 
278. Id. at 69–70 (statement of the Anti-Defamation League).
279. Id. at 2 (opening remarks of Don Edwards). 
280.  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
281. But see Brief Amicus Curiae of Institute for Animal Rights Law et al. in Support
of Respondent City of Hialeah, Florida, Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (No. 91-948), 
1992 WL 12008584 (including Jews for Animal Rights among those joining the brief). 
282. Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 525–28. 
283. Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans United for Separation of Church and State 
et al., in Support of Petitioners at 8, Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (No. 91-948), 1992 
WL 12008578, at *8. 
284. Id. at 16. 
285. Id. at 16–17. 
286. Brief of the National Jewish Commission of Law and Public Affairs (“COLPA”) as
Amicus Curiae at 6, Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (No. 91-948), 1992 WL 12008552, 
at *6. 
287. Id. at 12–13. 
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Moreover, when the Supreme Court considered a challenge to RFRA’s
constitutionality,288 Jewish organizations lined up to support RFRA either
under the Coalition for Free Exercise of Religion’s umbrella289 or on an 
individual basis.290  Ultimately,  the Supreme Court rejected  this view  and  
invalidated RFRA’s applicability to state law as beyond Congress’s
constitutional authority.291 In response, many states enacted their own 
versions of RFRA or, in some instances, interpreted state constitutional
provisions so that those provisions provided analogous RFRA protections 
against state law.292 In this way, the RFRA initiative—joined by Jewish 
institutions—undid what it perceived as significant damage to religious
liberty and ensured that the pre-Smith framework remained applicable not 
only on the federal level but also in a large number of states.293 
By the late 1990s, consensus around the pre-Smith substantial burden
standard began to splinter as some groups from the Coalition for Free
Exercise “began to address the question of religious exemptions to civil 
rights laws.”294 These worries included cases such as where “religious 
landlords or employers claim the right not to comply with laws that forbid
them from discriminating on basis of religion, marital status, or sexual 
orientation.”295 Accordingly, by early 2000, the number of Jewish institutions
288. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
289. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, 
Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent Flores app. A at app. 1–2, Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10286, at *30 (including as amici Agudath Israel of America; 
Aleph Institute; AJCommittee; AJCongress; ADL; B’nai B’rith; Central Conference 
of American Rabbis; Council of Jewish Federations; Hadassah: The Women’s Zionist 
Organization of America; International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists; Jewish 
Reconstructionist Federation; National Council of Jewish Women; COLPA; NJCRAC; 
RCA; Union of American Hebrew Congregations; OU; United Synagogue of Conservative 
Judaism; Women of Reform Judaism—Federation of Temple Sisterhoods). 
290. See, e.g., Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public Affairs
(“COLPA”) as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1–2, Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 9092, at *1–2; Brief Amicus Curiae of Prison Fellowship Ministries 
& the Aleph Institute in Support of Respondents at 1–2, Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (No. 95-2074), 
1997 WL 10274, at *1–2. 
291. Flores, 521 U.S. at 511. 
292. As of 2015, twenty-one states guaranteed RFRA protections either statutorily 
or constitutionally. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/5ZBU-NETP].
293. See id.













      
  
   
 




    
  
    
  
 
    
 
   
  
   
    
  
     
 
        
 
        
     
      
          
      
      
 




supporting additional legislative expansion of the substantial burden framework
had dwindled.296  That notwithstanding, Congress still bolstered religious
liberty efforts in 2000 by enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA),297 which extended the federal RFRA framework
to “land use regulation” and “persons[s] residing in or confined to an
institution.”298 
As a result of these legislative developments, much of the religious
liberty litigation before the Supreme Court in the twenty-first century has
centered around statutory claims related to either RFRA or RLUIPA, with
the Free Exercise Clause taking somewhat of a back seat due to the limited
protections it provides post-Smith. However, this growing dissensus among
Jewish institutions did not manifest itself immediately in litigation before 
the Supreme Court.  Thus, although the legal hook for many religious liberty
claims changed, Jewish institutions initially remained largely aligned as 
they had in the 1980s. Collectively, at least in the early rounds of Supreme 
Court litigation during the 2000s, these groups did not directly challenge 
the substantial burden framework of the pre-Smith days. Rather, they 
focused their disagreement on where the precise boundaries for these 
religious liberty claims should lie.
For example, amicus briefs filed by Jewish institutions in Locke v. Davey299 
split over whether Washington State violated the Free Exercise Clause by
excluding individuals pursuing a degree in devotional theology from its 
state scholarship for post-secondary school. Jewish institutional positions 
tracked typical views on the interaction between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses.300 The ADL, along with the JCPA and a number
of other Jewish organizations, filed a brief supporting the State of Washington, 
which argued that the exclusion in the scholarship program “protects the
religious exercise rights of all [Washington’s] citizens by providing greater
296. In 1998, the Coalition for Free Exercise of Religion still retained its broad
consensus. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 2148 Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 305 (1998) (memorandum to Members of Congress
from the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, including list of members).  However,
by 1999, far fewer institutions joined a letter to Orrin Hatch from the Religious Liberty
Protection Act Leadership Group, encouraging Congress to move forward with the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act instead of the Religious Liberty Protection 
Act. Jacob, supra note 294, at 829 n.146, 829–30 (listing organizations signing the letter 
to Orrin Hatch).
297. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012)). 
298. Id. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-1(a). 
299.  540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
300. See infra notes 301–05 and accompanying text. 
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anti-establishment protections than . . . the United States Constitution.”301 
Advancing parallel disestablishment arguments, the AJCongress advanced 
the claim ultimately adopted by the Court302 that “[t]here is ‘play in the
joints,’ interstitially, for legislators to widen or contract the gap between
religion and state without violating the Free Exercise Clause, precisely as
the legislature may expand the scope of religious accommodation without 
violating the Establishment Clause.”303 
By contrast, COLPA—again representing a range of Orthodox Jewish 
institutions—took the opposite view, arguing that “[d]isqualifying students 
seeking to pursue religious studies—no matter what else they may be
studying simultaneously—constitutes a degree of hostility to religion that
is unconstitutional under authoritative rulings of this Court.”304 Although
not unified on the ultimate merits of the case, Jewish institutions filing 
amicus briefs in Davey split in ways that were consistent with the debates 
of the 1980s—the degree to which the Establishment Clause ought to place
limits on the scope of the Free Exercise Clause.305 
Continued debates over the extent to which disestablishment principles 
limited religious liberty protections resurfaced again in the 2006 Supreme 
Court decision Cutter v. Wilkinson, where the constitutionality of RLUIPA
was challenged on Establishment Clause grounds.306  Here, Jewish institutions
lined up behind RLUIPA and supported its constitutionality. The 
AJCommittee, ADL, and JCPA all jointly filed a brief with the Coalition 
for Free Exercise of Religion, which, quoting Amos, argued that “RLUIPA, 
like so many other statutes accommodating religious exercise, fits comfortably 
within the ‘ample room under the Establishment Clause for benevolent neutrality
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and 
301. Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League et al. in Support of Petitioners 
at 5, Locke, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21692828, at *5 (including as amici the
ADL; Hadassah: The Women’s Zionist Organization of America; JCPA; and the Commission
on Social Action of Reform Judaism). 
302. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 718–19 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). 
303. Brief Amici Curiae of the American Jewish Congress et al. at 1, Locke, 540
U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21697726, at *1 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 669). 
304. Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public Affairs (“COLPA”) 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5, Locke, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315), 2003 
WL 22087608, at *5. 
305. See Robert A. Destro, “By What Right?”: The Sources and Limits of Federal Court 
and Congressional Jurisdiction Over Matters “Touching Religion,” 29 IND.L.REV.1, 21 (1995). 
306.  See 544 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2005). 
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without interference.’”307 The OU filed a brief similarly contending that
“[e]xemptions do not support religion in any way that was ever part of an 
establishment of religion. Properly administered, exemptions are substantively
neutral.”308 The AJCongress, among others, served as counsel for the petitioners
and argued to uphold their rights under RLUIPA.309 
Only two years later, the Court addressed yet another RFRA challenge—
this time, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 
a case that involved a religious sect that received communion via the 
drinking of a sacramental tea, which included a hallucinogen prohibited 
under federal law.310 The sect sued for protection under RFRA—a claim
supported by Jewish institutions’ filing amicus briefs.311 Thus, a number
of Jewish institutions—including the AJCongress, AJCommittee, ADL, and 
JCPA—joined an amicus brief supporting, once again, the constitutionality 
of RFRA.312 Another brief, joined by the Agudath Israel and the Union
for Reform Judaism, contested the government’s claim that it could satisfy
the “compelling government interest” required by RFRA and thereby justify
its refusal to allow use of the sacramental tea.313 
B. Culture Wars and the New Jewish Dissensus 
After 2006, consensus among Jewish institutions in the briefing before 
the Supreme Court on religious liberty claims, tracking the dissensus of 
the late 1990s over religious liberty legislative initiatives,314 would be
increasingly hard to come by. As foreshadowed at the end of the 1990s, 
much of this growing division coincided with the culture wars, in which the
307. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion at 4, app. 
A at 31–32, Cutter, 544 U.S. 709 (No. 03-9877), 2004 WL 2961151, at *4, *1A–2a 
(quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of LDS v. Amos, 483 U.S. 
327, 334 (1987)) (including as amici Agudath Israel of America; Aleph; AJCommittee; 
ADL; B’nai B’rith International; Central Conference of American Rabbis; Hadassah: The 
Women’s Zionist Organization of America; Jewish Council for Public Affairs; Jewish Prisoner 
Services International; Jewish Reconstructionist Federation; RCA; Union for Reform 
Judaism; OU; and United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism). 
308. Brief of National Association of Evangelicals & Union of Orthodox Jewish 
Congregations of America as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Cutter, 544 U.S. 
709 (No. 03-9877), 2004 WL 2967824, at *2. 
309. See generally Brief for Petitioners, Cutter, 544 U.S. 709 (No. 03-9877), 2004
WL 2967822. 
310.  546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006). 
311. See infra notes 312–13 and accompanying text. 
312. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Various Religious & Civil Rights Organizations in
Support of Respondents app. A at A-1–A-5, Gonzales, 546 U.S. 418 (No. 04-1084), 2005 
WL 2237537, at *1A–3a. 
313. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Baptist Joint Committee et al. in Support of Respondents
at 4, 13–14, Gonzales, 546 U.S. 418 (No. 04-1084), 2005 WL 2237539, at *4, *13–14. 
314. See supra notes 294–96 and accompanying text. 
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broader religious liberty consensus—and consensus around RFRA—dissipated. 
Indeed, criticism grew as RFRA—originally viewed as protecting vulnerable 
and politically marginalized religious minorities—became increasingly seen 
as a statutory tool to discriminate against other vulnerable groups such as
women and members of the LGBT community.315 Maybe the clearest statement
of this concern came from Louise Melling, deputy legal director of the ACLU,
in a 2015 op-ed in the Washington Post.316 In Melling’s words, RFRA was
“initially passed to protect the exercise of religious belief, including
by vulnerable religious minorities.”317 But, in Melling’s view, the ACLU
could 
no longer support the law in its current form. For more than 15 years, we have
been concerned about how the RFRA could be used to discriminate against
others. As the events of the past couple of years amply illustrate, our fears were 
well-founded. . . . [RFRA] is now often used as a sword to discriminate against 
women, gay and transgender people and others.  Efforts of this nature will likely 
only increase should the Supreme Court rule—as is expected—that same-sex 
couples have the freedom to marry.318 
This rationale captures the stakes in the culture wars—a clash built upon 
two primary shifts in social reality. The first was the increasingly rapid 
social change319 with respect to “sexual norms”320 or “sexual morality,”321 
including views on abortion, contraception and—maybe most importantly— 
same-sex marriage.322 The second shift was the locking of swords on
315. See Louise Melling, ACLU: Why We Can No Longer Support the Federal ‘Religious








319. See Peter Baker, Same-Sex Marriage Support Shows Pace of Social Change 
sex-marriage-support-shows-pace-of-social-change-accelerating.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7WDR-JPHW]. 
320. Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2518 (2014). 
321. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
839, 846 (2014). 
322. Horwitz, supra note 12, at 159–60 (“This legal contestation has been accompanied
by—indeed, may be driven by—significant social dissensus.  Although Hobby Lobby itself 
involves a controversial social issue—the status of women’s reproductive rights—much 
of the reason for the shift in views on accommodation involves another contested field in 
355





    
   
 
    
 
 




   
  







        
   
   
      
         
 
     
  
     
issues surrounding sexual morality through the assertion of “[c]omplicity
claims”—that is, “faith claims about how to live in community with others 
who do not share the claimant’s beliefs, and whose lawful conduct the person 
of faith believes to be sinful.”323 Together, these two social shifts have
led to an increasing number of clashes between religiously-motivated 
individuals and the law; accordingly, because many religious individuals 
maintain traditional views about sexual morality, they therefore refuse to 
abide by laws they view as requiring participation in or support for “sinful” 
conduct that embraces an alternate view of sexual morality. 
Maybe the two most well-known of these conflicts have been over the
so-called contraception mandate and over public accommodations laws.324 
Conflict in the former category began when many for-profit employers were 
required, pursuant to the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate, to 
provide employees with health insurance that covered FDA-approved 
contraceptives or face significant penalties.325 A wide range of religiously 
motivated for-profit institutions brought suit against the mandate, arguing
that providing employees with insurance coverage for contraception made 
them complicit in conduct they believe to be sinful—in other words, complying 
with the mandate required them to violate their religious consciences.326 
Because religious for-profit institutions were not exempted from the mandate,
these institutions asserted religious liberty claims pursuant to RFRA. 
The latter category of complicity-claim conflicts includes a series of 
cases where religiously motivated businesses—including a baker,327 a florist,328 
the American culture wars: the status of gay rights and same-sex marriage.” (footnote 
omitted)).
323. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 320, at 2519. 
324. See infra text accompanying notes 325–30. 
325. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). But 
see Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III—There is No “Employer Mandate,” BALKINIZATION
(Dec. 16, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-iiitheres-no-employer.
html [https://perma.cc/TK2E-3ZJ6] (arguing that employers are not mandated to provide 
contraception and have other alternatives such as not providing an employee health-care 
plan).
326. For a list of cases brought against the contraception mandate, see HHS Case 
Database, BECKET, http://www.becketlaw.org/research-central/hhs-info-central/hhs-case-
database/ [https://perma.cc/M7WS-QSHN]. 
327. See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (holding the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated the Free Exercise
Clause when it ruled a baker violated a state antidiscrimination act because the its treatment of 
the baker’s case displayed prohibited hostility towards his religious beliefs). 
328. See generally Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018)
(granting the petition for certiorari, vacating the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion denying 
the florist’s Free Exercise claims and remanding for further consideration in light of 
Masterpiece Cakeshop). 
356
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and a photographer329—have clashed with prevailing antidiscrimination 
laws by refusing to provide their services at same-sex weddings and commitment 
ceremonies. In those cases, the vendors argued that, as religiously motivated 
individuals, their right to religious liberty was abridged by the prevailing 
public accommodations laws—laws that prohibited them, via their commercial 
enterprises, from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation in the 
provision of services, notwithstanding the fact they believed that providing 
services at a same-sex wedding ceremony violated their religious consciences.330 
Not surprisingly, as these disputes unfolded, the narrative surrounding
religious liberty began to change,331 with a growing perception that religious
liberty stood at odds with either women’s health or same-sex marriage.332 
Accordingly, some viewed the doctrinal tools of religious liberty—such as 
RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause—as the tools of discrimination rather 
than shields to prevent discrimination.333 
This shift in perception was not without consequences. Maybe nowhere 
has it been more evident than in recent clashes over attempts by state 
329. See generally Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (rejecting the RFRA defense in a case dealing with a 
photographer). 
330. See supra notes 327–29. 
331. I have explored this further in Michael A. Helfand, Religion and the Family in 
the Wake of Hobby Lobby, in THE CONTESTED PLACE OF RELIGION IN FAMILY LAW 40 
(Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2018). 
332. See Using Religion to Discriminate, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/religious- 
liberty/using-religion-discriminate [https://perma.cc/8UWT-REDL] (providing examples 
of individuals and institutions using religious objections to discriminate against women and 
LGBT people).
333. See, e.g., Josh Eidelson, Conservative Regroup on Religious-Freedom Bills, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2015, 3:00 AM), www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-04-
14/conservatives-regroup-on-religious-freedom-bills [https://perma.cc/CJW4-VUMD] (quoting
Adam Talbot, spokesman of the Human Rights Campaign, as saying RFRAs are “being
used as a cudgel by religious majorities to evade the enforcement of civil rights law”);
Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern, The 10 Worst Civil Liberties Violations of 2014, 
SLATE (Dec. 29, 2014, 1:32 PM), www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
2014/12/civil_liberties_violations_of_2014_civil_forfeiture_grand_juries_religion.html
[https://perma.cc/D9BN-3FCP] (“Increasingly, to the conservatives of the Roberts court,
‘religious liberty’ means the freedom of religious majorities to push their religious beliefs
on the rest of us.”); Meredith Somers, Religious Freedom Cases to Fill Supreme Court Docket, 
WASH. TIMES (July 7, 2014), www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/7/religious-freedom-
cases-to-fill-supreme-court-dock/?page=all [https://perma.cc/G5AY-P2RK] (quoting 
Alex Luchenitser, associate legal director at Americans United for the Separation of Church
and State, arguing that the Hobby Lobby ruling “allow[s] religious majorities to impose 
their religious beliefs on people who don’t follow those beliefs”). 
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legislatures to enact new versions of RFRA. Of these clashes, the conflict
surrounding Indiana’s attempt to enact a new RFRA in 2015 stands out
for its relentlessness.334 While many states maintained similar statutes, 
the national backlash against Indiana’s attempt to do so was swift, overwhelming,
and ubiquitous.335 Actors, CEOs, athletes, pop stars, and politicians all decried 
Indiana’s new “religious freedom law,” characterizing it as driven by
antigay discrimination.336 Much of this perception resulted from the timing;
the legislature’s attempt to enact a state RFRA in Indiana arose as debate
over the public accommodations cases worked their way through the legal
system.337 Indeed, some supporters of the Indiana bill claimed the new
legislation was needed to protect business owners from liability under 
antidiscrimination laws,338 leading to the rank condemnation of the law 
across the United States. The Indiana legislature hurriedly amended the 
law in an attempt to quell the growing outrage.339 And Indiana has turned 
out to be just the beginning.340 Other states have also introduced bills with 
334. See Associated Press, Indiana Enacts Religious-Objections Law, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 26, 2015, 11:20 AM), www.wsj.com/articles/indiana-enacts-religious-objections-
law-1427383220 [https://perma.cc/5M6M-HHPA]. 
335. See Mark Peters & Jack Nicas, Indiana Religious Freedom Law Sparks Fury, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2015, 7:34 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/indiana-religious-freedom-
law-sparks-fury-1427491304 [https://perma.cc/N9CX-EHLU].
336. German Lopez, How Major Celebrities and Businesses Are Reacting to Indiana’s 
Religious Freedom Law, VOX (Mar. 31, 2015, 1:45 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/3/30/ 
8312423/indiana-lgbt-businesses-celebrities [https://perma.cc/5FGB-JGAR].
337. See Brian Miller, The Age of RFRA, FORBES (Nov. 16, 2018, 3:46 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/briankmiller/2018/11/16/the-age-of-rfra/#2dfe1c3977ba 
[https://perma.cc/387U-U8BZ] (discussing notable years of RFRA). 
338. See, e.g., Jeremy Diamond, Indiana’s Religious Freedom Law: What You Need
To Know, CNN (Mar. 29, 2015, 4:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/27/politics/indiana-
religious-freedom-explainer/index.html [https://perma.cc/HHG3-7FRY] (“[S]tanding behind
with Pence as he signed the bill were several socially conservative lobbyists, the ones who 
pushed for the law and are fiercely opposed to same-sex marriage. One of those lobbyists, 
Eric Miller, explicitly wrote on his website that the law would protect businesses from 
participating in ‘homosexual marriage.’”); Sandhya Somashekhar, Christian Activists: Indiana 




339. See Mark Peters & Ana Campoy, ‘Religious Freedom’ Measures Revamped, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2015, 6:27 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/indiana-lawmakers-unveil-changes-to-
religious-freedom-law-1427981035 [https://perma.cc/57QR-9QYY].
340. See, e.g., Tamara Audi, Arizona Vetoes Religious Bill Criticized as Anti-Gay, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2014, 10:26 AM), www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527
02304255604579407784144050074 [https://perma.cc/GVX8-GQY6]; Laura Meckler & 
Ana Campoy, Arkansas Governor Calls for Changes to ‘Religious Freedom’ Bill, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2015, 7:43 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/arkansas-governor-calls-for-
changes-to-religious-freedom-bill-1427904740 [https://perma.cc/EY6Y-K7RK].
358
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new wrinkles to the RFRA framework,341 many of which have similarly
faced significant criticism. In light of that criticism, some of these bills 
have been amended342 and some vetoed.343 
Given these broad social shifts—and the overall change in perception 
surrounding both religious liberty and the religious accommodationist 
agenda—it is not surprising that Jewish institutions have become 
increasingly divided on questions of religious liberty. But what is unique 
about this new wave of dissensus is not that it simply exists, but that in
recent amicus briefs, Jewish institutions have modified their historical
positions and advanced fundamentally new arguments before the Court.  
In this way, early indications from the culture wars are that they will not 
only increase the degree of dissensus among American Jewish institutions, 
but they also will unsettle—across the political spectrum—the fundamental
areas of agreement that existed until recently. To be sure, reading too much
into this wave of briefs would be hasty. The time period in question—
approximately a decade old—provides a limited set of cases, and therefore
a limited set of briefs, to examine. Yet, these initial indications of growing
dissensus highlight that new debates between Jewish institutions are not 
simply a rehashing of old—even if more extreme—arguments, although 
there is certainly some of that. 
Instead, Jewish institutions have responded to culture war litigation over 
religious liberty by making new types of arguments that not only encourage
limits on the pre-Smith substantial burden framework but also raise increasing 
skepticism of the asserted religious liberty claims themselves.344  Maybe
341. For a collection of attempts to enact state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 
in 2015, 2016, and 2017, see 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Sept. 3, 2015), www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-
state-rfra-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/9MVG-REHF]; 2016 State Religious Freedom 
Restoration Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Dec. 31, 2016), www.ncsl.org/research/ 
civil-and-criminal-justice/2016-state-religious-freedom-restoration-act-legislation.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/9C3S-BQ76]; 2017 Religious Freedom Restoration Act Legislation, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGIS. (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/
2017-religious-freedom-restoration-act-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/2K75-4EWU].
342. See, e.g., Eric Bradner, Arkansas Governor Signs Amended ‘Religious Freedom’
Measure, CNN (Apr. 2, 2015, 5:59 PM), www.cnn.com/2015/03/31/politics/arkansas-
religious-freedom-anti-lgbt-bill/ [https://perma.cc/BB3G-7ZXJ].
343. See, e.g., Sandhya Somashekhar, Georgia Governor Vetoes Religious Freedom 
Bill Criticized as Anti-Gay, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-nation/wp/2016/03/28/georgia-governor-to-veto-religious-freedom-bill-criticized-as-
anti-gay/?utm_term=.85a716f3c87e [https://perma.cc/6ZHK-7F4V].
344. See Ungar-Sargon, supra note 19. 
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even more remarkable is that, notwithstanding some commentary to the
contrary, these shifts towards a more progressive agenda have occurred
across the political spectrum of Jewish institutions, including some of the 
very institutions perceived as shifting towards more traditionalist views.345 
In this way, the morphing positions of various Jewish institutions have 
increased the scope and depth of dissensus over religious liberty while
simultaneously opening the possibility of alternative approaches to religious
liberty issues that might be seen as, to use the now familiar frame, neither 
Christian nor pagan. Below, I highlight these shifts by considering the 
amicus briefs in three key areas of culture war litigation before the Supreme
Court.
1. Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC (2012)
Although identifying the beginnings of this period of transition is somewhat 
challenging, the Supreme Court’s 2012 Hosanna-Tabor346 decision provides 
a useful starting point. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court considered the claims 
of Cheryl Perich, an elementary school teacher at a church-operated school 
alleging that her employer violated her rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.347 The employer, however, claimed that because Perich
was a “called” teacher, it was shielded from liability pursuant to the “ministerial 
exception,” which exempts religious institutions from complying with various 
antidiscrimination statutes in the hiring and firing of ministers.348  In turn,
the case put the applicability and constitutionality of the ministerial exception 
front-and-center before the Court.
Briefing from the parties emphasized the high constitutional stakes facing 
the Court. Although lower courts had long adopted the ministerial exception 
as a doctrinal outgrowth of the religion clauses,349 Perich and the EEOC 
encouraged the Court to adopt a new constitutional approach—that whatever 
protections were afforded religious institutions by the First Amendment 
stemmed from the freedom of association and not the religion clauses.350 
345. Id. 
346. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
347.  Id. at 178–79. 
348. Id. at 177, 180 (differentiating “called” teachers—those “called to their vocation by
God through a congregation”—from “contract” teachers—those “appointed by the school 
board, without a vote of the congregation”). 
349. Id. at 188 (“[T]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a
‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of such
legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution
and its ministers.”). 
350. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (No. 10-
553) (“We don’t see that line of church autonomy principles in the religion clause jurisprudence
as such.  We see it as a question of freedom of association.”).
360
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Thus, as characterized by the Court, “[t]he EEOC and Perich . . . see no 
need—and no basis—for a special rule for ministers grounded in the Religion 
Clauses themselves.”351 The Court, in a unanimous decision, rejected this
claim, finding for the employer and reasserting that the religion clauses
served as the proper constitutional home for the ministerial exception.352 
Not surprisingly, a variety of Jewish institutions filed amicus briefs 
supporting the church-operated school. COLPA filed a brief representing 
a range of Orthodox Jewish institutions and endorsing a broad application 
of the ministerial exception because “controversies between religious 
institutions and their present or former employees should be considered
and determined by religious authorities applying the principles that govern 
the faith.”353  The brief further stated that limiting application of the exception 
based upon the “primary duties” of the employee violated the strictures of
the religion clauses.354  The OU filed an amicus brief as well, which
unequivocally supported the church-operated school: “The church has the
right to select its ministers, and when the dispute is between the church and 
the church member who seeks to serve in ministry, there is no occasion—
no justification whatsoever—for the state to become involved.”355 
But some of the other amicus interventions struck a different note. The 
AJCommittee and the Union for Reform Judaism filed a brief that supported 
the church-operated school,356 albeit in a limited fashion.  The brief argued
351. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189.
352. Id. at 189 (“[T]he text of the First Amendment . . . gives special solicitude to the
rights of religious organizations. We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion
Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.”). 
353. Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public  
Affairs (“COLPA”) et al. in Support of Petitioner at 2, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (No. 
10-553), 2011 WL 2470841, at *2 [hereinafter COLPA Brief Hosanna-Tabor] (including
as amici COLPA; Agudath Israel; National Council of Young Israel; Agudas Harabonim 
of the United States and Canada; Rabbinical Alliance of America; Torah Umesorah; Baltimore 
Bais Din; Beth Din of the Rabbinical Council of California; Kehilla Beis Din of Los Angeles; 
Maysharim Bais Din of Lakewood; and Bais Din Tzedek U’Mishpat of New York). 
354. Id. at 12–14. 
355. Brief of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 3, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470845,
at *3. In addition, the Jewish Educational Center joined an amicus brief with other religious 
educational institutions supporting the church-operated school. See generally Brief of Amici 
Curiae Jewish Educational Center et al. in Support of Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 
171 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470835 [hereinafter Jewish Educational Center Brief Hosanna-
Tabor].
356. It is worth noting that the AJCongress closed in 2010—an event triggered by its
significant endowment exposure to the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme. See Jacob Berkman,
361
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that the lower court erred when it failed to classify Perich as a minister 
based upon a quantitative assessment—“based on arbitrary factors such
as the comparative quantity of time spent on activities the court deems
‘religious’”—as opposed to a qualitative assessment that is “holistic, objectively
examining the nature of the position and the particular employee’s function
within the religious organization.”357 This assessment stood in contrast to 
COLPA and the OU, which had advocated for far broader application of 
the ministerial exception than a “primary duties” approach would allow.358 
Moreover, a number of Jewish institutions filed briefs in favor of Perich.
This included the National Council for Jewish Women, which joined the
ACLU and other organizations;359 the Jewish Board of Advocates for
Children, which joined other victims’ rights groups;360 and the Society for 
Humanistic Judaism, which joined other secular, humanist, and atheist
organizations.361 Perhaps the most noteworthy amicus brief filed by a
Jewish institution supporting Perich was that submitted by the ADL. In
setting up the argument in its brief, the ADL noted that evaluating an 
application of the ministerial exception brought two of its principal 
American Jewish Congress Closes After 88 Years of Human Rights Work, JEWISH CHRON. 
(July 29, 2010), http://www.jewishchronicle.org/2010/07/29/american-jewish-congress-
closes-after-88-years-of-human-rights-work/ [https://perma.cc/475E-UWSC]. Marc
Stern, General Counsel from 1999 until the AJCongress’s closure, subsequently became 
the Associate General Counsel at the AJCommittee in 2010. Am. Jewish Comm., Marc Stern
Named AJC Associate General Counsel, CISION (Aug. 2, 2010, 2:23 AM), https://www. 
prnewswire.com/news-releases/marc-stern-named-ajc-associate-general-counsel-99774 
564.html [https://perma.cc/63NT-E8QC].
357. Brief of the American Jewish Committee & the Union for Reform Judaism
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2–3, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (No. 10-
553), 2011 WL 2470842, at *2–3. 
358. COLPA Brief Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 353, at 2 (“This principle extends 
beyond employment controversies with employees whose ‘primary duties’ are religious.
It includes all claims made by or against any employee whose duties relate in any manner 
to the religious doctrine or teaching of his or her employer, particularly if, as is true of
Jewish institutions, a meaningful internal religious remedy is available to the plaintiff.”);
Jewish Educational Center Brief Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 355, at 5 (“But this case
illustrates the flaw in the ‘primary duties’ formulation: the Court of Appeals decided that 
a ‘called’ teacher of religion, who also led students in prayer three times a day, could nonetheless 
challenge her termination because these duties were not ‘primary’—too many other ‘secular’ 
duties were also part of her job.  In amici’s view, the church must have the right, free from 
state interference, to select those engaged in church governance, worship, teaching or other
related functions, regardless of whether they have other duties as well.”).
359. See generally Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (No. 10-553), 
2011 WL 3532695. 
360. See generally Brief of BishopAccountablity.org et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3532696. 
361. See generally Brief Amici Curiae of the American Humanist Association et al.
in Support of Respondents, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3488989. 
362
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commitments into tension.  On the one hand, the “ADL counts among its
core beliefs strict adherence to the separation of Church and State embodied 
in the Establishment Clause” and “a zealous defense of the Free Exercise 
Clause is essential to the health of our religiously diverse society;” on
the other hand, the “ADL is a fervent advocate of the enforcement of 
antidiscrimination laws that aim to eradicate discrimination.”362 
To balance these commitments, the ADL argued that the ministerial
exception should be crafted as an affirmative defense, which would ensure 
that courts engage in the “factual inquiry [that] is needed as to the merits 
of the claims.”363 By endorsing the ministerial exception but advocating
for judicial latitude “to delve into the merits of a plaintiff’s claim of 
discrimination in order to ascertain whether the ministerial exception applies 
in each such case,” the ADL presented an approach it believed provided 
“the best way to guarantee the proper balance between the eradication of
discrimination and the protections afforded under the First Amendment.”364 
What makes the brief filed by the ADL, and to a lesser extent by 
AJCommittee, noteworthy is that they advocated limiting the religious 
liberty rights of institutions by encouraging judicial inquiry into the religious
quality of the asserted ministerial claim. In so doing, both the ADL and 
AJCommittee compromised, to some extent, some of their longstanding
separationist commitments that animated their prior interventions in conflicts 
between religious liberty and employment law. 
On this count, it may be worth contrasting the ADL’s brief in Hosanna-
Tabor with its brief in Amos, discussed at length above.365  In Amos, the 
ADL supported striking down § 702 of Title VII, which provided a statutory 
exemption to religious organizations on Establishment Clause grounds.366 
Accordingly, the ADL’s brief constituted somewhat of an outlier in the
broader scheme of Jewish institutional amicus briefs filed in the 1980s. 
Even so, the ADL’s position in Amos was predicated on the important free
exercise protections that would still redound to religious organizations’ 
benefit in the absence of § 702. Thus, in Amos, the ADL took the position 
that the prohibition of Title VII would not apply to a religious organization
in the “the hiring and supervision of ministers and minister-like employees” 
362. Brief of Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League in Support of Respondents at 
1, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3532694, at *1. 
363. Id. at 3. 
364. Id. at 5–6. 
365. See supra notes 188–202 and accompanying text. 
366.  See supra notes 188–93 and accompanying text. 
363
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or “the operation of religious schools.”367 Indeed, the reasons why the ADL
argued that the Free Exercise Clause did not shield the employer from the 
Title VII claims in Amos were closely tied to the fact that the employee’s 
duties were “purely secular” and the employer’s activities neither included
any “religious ritual” nor any attempt to “teach[] or spread[] the Mormon 
Church’s religious beliefs or practices.”368 This absence guaranteed that 
enforcing Title VII avoided constitutionally prohibited religious inquiries— 
ensuring the Court would not impermissibly “interfere[] in any way with 
the religious doctrine or internal affairs of the Church.”369 
The ADL’s position in Hosanna-Tabor appeared to expand beyond many
of these constitutional constraints. A court addressing Perich’s claim would
engage in an inquiry into the underlying facts of whether the employee was
indeed a minister.370 In so doing, the ADL believed a court could potentially 
find liability notwithstanding the fact that the claims implicated an employee 
who certainly seemed “minister-like”; proceeding on such claims would 
require intervening in the “operation of religious schools”; the required 
judicial inquiry would entail an assessment of the religious content of the 
employer relationship in an employment environment geared towards 
teaching “religious beliefs or practices.”371 
To be sure, this is not to say that the ADL’s brief in Hosanna-Tabor
contradicted its brief in Amos—far from it.  The ADL’s brief in Amos, however,
represented an outlier in terms of Jewish institutional willingness to strike
down statutory provisions protective of religious institutional employment 
practices. And as the first salvo from a Jewish institution in the culture war
litigation, the ADL pressed beyond even those asserted limitations, opening
up the door to finding religious institutions liable—and even inviting courts
to inject themselves into the internal affairs of church-operated schools 
and minister-like employees.372 
Accordingly, briefs in Hosanna-Tabor expanded the dissensus among 
Jewish institutions in two important ways. First, Jewish institutions divided
over whether courts could inquire into the religious responsibilities of 
employees and thereby limit the reach of free exercise protections afforded
religious institutions. Second, some Jewish institutional amici moved beyond 
367. ADL Brief Amos, supra note 188, at 15. 
368.  Id. at 18. 
369. Id. at 19. 
370. Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Civil Procedure and the Ministerial Exception, 
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1847, 1874 (2018). 
371. ADL Brief Amos, supra note 188, at 15, 18.
372. For my attempt at doing so, see generally Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote 
Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1891 (2013), which describes
how “principles of the implied consent and marginal judicial review provide a vision
of church autonomy that tracks the structure of arbitration.”
364
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prior willingness to apply relatively broad protections to minister and minister-
like employees when in the service of a religious organization pursuing
religious objectives. In so doing, progressive Jewish institutions explored 
alternative ways to limit and interrogate the scope of religious protections 
afforded religious institutions—alternatives directed no longer at the periphery
of religious liberty doctrine, but to its center. 
2. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) and Zubik v. Burwell (2016)
If Hosanna-Tabor demonstrated a willingness among some Jewish
institutions to nudge beyond old constitutional limits, the contraception 
mandate cases—Hobby Lobby and Zubik—would represent an even broader 
embrace of that trend. Hobby Lobby and Zubik find their origins in the 
Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate,373 which was enacted pursuant 
to the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health and Human
Services.374 Those guidelines required covered insurance plans to include
“[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, 
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women
with reproductive capacity.”375 Final rules issued by the Department of Health 
and Human Services provided an exemption for “religious employers,” 
although that exemption did not cover for-profit companies.376 In response 
to the guidelines, numerous Christian institutions filed suit, arguing that
complying with the contraception mandate would require them to violate 
373. See Trump Administration Issues Final Rules Protecting Conscience Rights in
Health Insurance, HHS (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/11/07/ 
trump-administration-issues-final-rules-protecting-conscience-rights-in-health-insurance.html
[http://perma.cc/85K9-J84K].
374. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012) (“A group health plan and a health insurance 
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide 
coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements . . . with respect to women, 
such additional preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines 
supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph.”). 
375. Women’s Preventative Services Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERV. ADMIN.,
https://www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines/index.html [https://perma.cc/K8PC-EVQG]; see
also Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 
46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2018)). 
376. 
365
 45 C.F.R. § 147.130. 
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their religious consciences.377 This wave of lawsuits fell into two broad
categories. 
The first category of lawsuit included for-profit companies who argued
that the government’s refusal to extend its exemption beyond the category
of nonprofit companies violated their rights under the federal RFRA.378 
In 2014, this claim made its way before the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby, 
in which the Court held that the contraception mandate substantially burdened 
the companies’ religious exercise and was not the least restrictive means
for ensuring employees received cost-free contraception.379  Indeed, the  
Court noted the government could extend the “religious employers” 
exemption—applicable to nonprofit companies—to for-profit companies,
thereby ensuring that employees received cost-free contraception without
burdening their employers’ religious commitments.380 
In reaching its holding, the Court addressed two central issues in the case— 
whether for-profit entities, given their overriding pecuniary motives, could 
engage in the “exercise of religion,” and therefore qualify for RFRA’s protection,
and whether in objecting to the contraception mandate, companies could 
demonstrate a substantial burden.381 Because both questions were threshold 
issues, the Court, holding in favor of Hobby Lobby, answered in the
affirmative. Referencing both the Dictionary Act and indications from past
precedent, the Court held that for-profit entities qualified as “persons” for 
the purpose of RFRA and that, given the costs of non-compliance with the
mandate, the plaintiffs had demonstrated the contraception mandate imposed 
a substantial burden on their religious exercise.382  The Court did so even
though the link between the provision of insurance and the alleged “sinful” 
conduct—the use of contraception—was somewhat attenuated.383 
The Orthodox Jewish Institutions, in an amicus brief filed by COLPA 
on behalf of the OU and RCA, among others, supported the RFRA 
claimants.384  In their brief, COLPA targeted the government’s argument
377. For updated information on the range of lawsuits filed against the contraception
mandate, see HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET L., https://www.becketlaw.org/ 
research-central/hhs-info-central/ [https://perma.cc/G6FE-QXVZ ]. 
378. See Scott W. Gaylord, For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS Mandate, 
91 WASH. U.L. REV. 589, 593 (2014). 
379. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759, 2785 (2014). 
380. Id. at 2782–84. 
381.  Id. at 2768, 2775. 
382.  Id. at 2768–77, 2779. 
383. Id. at 2765, 2775, 2777–79. See generally Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial
Burdens, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1771 (2016) (“[C]ourts should assess the substantiality of the 
civil penalties triggered by religious exercise.”). 
384. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public
Affairs (“COLPA”) et al., in Support of Respondents in No. 13-354 & in Support of Petitioners
366
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that excluded for-profit entities from RFRA’s protections.385 Specifically, 
the brief highlighted how neither the corporate form nor the choice to operate 
as a for-profit justified restricting an entity’s religious liberty protections 
under the Court’s precedent.386 This was of particular importance from 
the perspective of these organizations given that Jewish law, they argued, 
imposed religious obligations on entities regardless of their corporate form or 
profit motive.387 As a result, to withhold RFRA protections from for-profit
companies would leave many Jewish for-profit entities both subject to their
own perceived religious obligation—and thereby engaged in religious exercise— 
but without parallel religious liberty protections.388 
By contrast, the AJCommittee and JCPA filed a brief in favor of the
contraception mandate which was very much in the mold of briefs from 
the 1980s. It expressly avoided the questions of “whether (i) a for-profit 
corporation has Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment or RFRA, 
or (ii) the Mandate imposes a substantial burden on religious practices.”389 
Instead, the brief focused its efforts on the limiting principle of RFRA,
evaluating whether the purported substantial burden on religious exercise
was the least restrictive means for advancing a compelling government
interest.390 Ultimately, the brief concluded “the Mandate furthers the
government’s compelling interests in promoting women’s equality and public 
health in the least restrictive means available.”391 
But a number of Jewish institutions took a very different route when 
filing briefs in Hobby Lobby. In stark contrast to the tactics in the first
phase of dissensus, several Jewish institutions attacked the very existence
in No. 13-356, at 15–16, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 




388. Id. at 11–14, 15–17 (providing examples of for-profit corporate religious 
exercise where RFRA protections would be necessary); see also Brief of the Christian 
Booksellers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, at 
1–3, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 343200, 
at *1–3. 
389. Brief Amicus Curiae of American Jewish Committee & Jewish Council for 
Public Affairs in Support of the Government at 3, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-
354, 13-356), 2014 WL 333892, at *3. 
390. Id.
391. Id. See generally Brief for the National Women’s Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of the Government, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 
WL 333895. 
367
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of a viable religious liberty claim in the first place. Thus, the amicus brief 
filed by, among others, the ADL, the Women’s Zionist Organization of 
America, and the National Council of Jewish Women argued that the for-
profit corporations’ RFRA claims failed because the government’s regulation 
did not constitute a substantial burden on two counts:
First, . . . the connection between the contraceptive rule and any impact on Appellants’ 
religious exercise is simply too attenuated . . . . The law does not require Appellants 
to use contraception themselves, to physically provide contraception to their
employees, or to endorse the use of contraception. . . . Second, the employee’s
independent decision about whether to obtain contraception breaks the causal
chain between the government action and any potential burden on Appellants’
free exercise.392 
This argument is noteworthy because it somewhat contrasts with the ADL’s
argument in Bob Jones.393 As described above, the ADL largely avoided 
addressing the quality or content of the religious liberty claim in Bob Jones, 
instead opting to focus on the compelling nature of the government’s interest.394 
In so doing, the ADL—and others—avoided building limitations on religious
liberty protections into the core of the substantial burden framework, leveraging
instead side constraints on the doctrine that flowed from external considerations
like the fundamental importance of the government’s implicated interest.395 
Other institutions attacked the viability of the religious liberty claim by
contesting whether for-profit entities were proper subjects of RFRA’s
protections. Thus, the Jewish Social Policy Action Network argued that 
“[e]xtending the definition of ‘person’ in RFRA to for-profit corporations 
would upset the delicate balance and lead us down a path where individuals 
could be deprived of federally protected rights because they did not share
the religious views of the company’s owners.”396 
The ADL was not alone in adopting this new approach to identifying 
limits on religious liberty.  Several other Jewish organizations have made 
similar arguments about the exclusion of for-profit entities from religious
liberty protections in various amicus filings before the Court. For example,
eleven Jewish institutions, including the AJCommittee, the National Council 
of Jewish Women, and the CCAR, referenced this issue in a joint amicus
392. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Defendants-Appellees and Urging at 8, Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th 
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-6294), 2013 WL 1291180, at *8 (citation omitted). 
393.  461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
394. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
395. See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text. 
396. Brief of Amicus Curiae Jewish Social Policy Action Network in Support of the
Government at 27, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 356644, at 
*27. 
368
HELFAND FINAL TO PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/2019 11:12 AM      
 
     
  
  
   
   
   
  





   
   
     
     
     





    
 
   
  
   
  
 
      
    
   
     




   
            
    
  
[VOL. 56: 305, 2019] Jews and the Culture Wars 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
brief397 filed in Obergefell v. Hodges—the case in which the Court upheld 
a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.398  In so doing, they argued,
under the heading, “Commercial Businesses Have No Constitutional Right
To Discriminate,” that “[a] business that avails itself of the benefits of doing
business with the public must be subject to the public’s rules for conducting
that business.”399 Considering these principles in the public accommodations
context, the brief went on to state that “when a business chooses to solicit 
customers from the general public, it relinquishes autonomy over whom 
to serve.”400 
Indeed, the primary arms of Reform Judaism, the CCAR and the RAC, 
would go on to reiterate this point in subsequent policy papers—papers
that made their way into their Supreme Court amicus brief in Masterpiece
Cakeshop.401 In their view, the fundamental problem with Hobby Lobby
was its holding “that RFRA applied to closely held for-profit corporations,” 
which is why “[t]he Reform Movement vociferously criticized the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, emphasizing the problems that stem from
giving corporations the same religious freedom rights as individuals under 
RFRA.”402 
The increasing number of Jewish institutions adopting the view that religious 
liberty claims in general—and RFRA claims in particular—ought not be 
available to for-profit corporations represents a shift from the general
consensus among Jewish institutions in the 1960s that for-profit entities 
ought to be able to assert free exercise rights. As described above, Jewish
institutions unanimously supported Orthodox Jewish merchants challenging 
Sunday Closing laws, in part, because of a uniformly held view that these
laws violated the free exercise rights of for-profit entities.403  The size and
397. Other signors included the Bend the Arc: A Jewish Partnership for Justice; Haddasah:
The Women’s Zionist Organization of America; the Jewish Social Policy Action Network; 
Keshet; Reconstructionist Rabbinical College and Jewish Reconstructionist Communities; 
T’ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights; Women of Reform Judaism; and Women’s 
League for Conservative Judaism.  See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation 
League in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 
14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1004712 [hereinafter ADL Brief Obergefell].
398. 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05. 
399. ADL Brief Obergefell, supra note 397, at 29. 
400. Id.
401. See Brief for Amici Curiae the Central Conference of American Rabbis et al. in
Support of Respondents at 20 n.35, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 5036302, at *20 n.35. 
402. CCAR on State RFRAs, supra note 16 (emphasis added). 
403. See supra notes 122–27 and accompanying text. 
369
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scope of some contemporary for-profit entities certainly dwarfs the scale
of the shops owned by mid-twentieth century Orthodox Jewish merchants,
but the shift towards rejecting the religious liberty rights of for-profit entities 
represents yet another important way in which Jewish institutional dissensus
during the culture wars has grown in fundamentally new ways.404 
And the growing divide over what claims qualify for religious liberty
protections did not stop with Hobby Lobby. In the wake of the Court’s 
decision in Hobby Lobby, the government amended its contraception mandate 
regulations to exempt both nonprofit as well as closely-held, for-profit entities
that “hold[] [themselves] out as . . . religious organization[s].”405 Initially, 
these nonprofits and closely-held, for-profit entities, unlike core religious
organizations such as churches and their auxiliaries,406 had to self-certify 
to qualify for this exemption by filling out Form 700 and sending the form 
to their respective insurers or third-party administrators.407 However, many
nonprofit companies objected to filling out Form 700; they viewed filing 
the paperwork—which secured the religious exemption—also triggered 
contraceptive insurance coverage for their employees.408 In turn, triggering
such coverage—even if provided by a third party and not paid for by the
employers—would make them complicit in conduct they believe to be 
sinful. Therefore, they contended that being put to the choice of filling 
out the form or complying with the mandate still constituted a substantial 
burden on their religious exercise—it continued to put them to the choice 
of compliance with the mandate or the payment of hefty financial penalties. 
Accordingly, they argued the self-certification requirement itself violated 
the protections afforded by RFRA.409 
404. The importance of the for-profit question is particularly noteworthy given the 
increasing growth of forms of commerce where parties simultaneously pursue commercial 
objectives alongside religious aspirations.  See generally Michael A. Helfand & Barak 
D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 DUKE L.J. 769 (2015). 
405.  45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b) (2018). 
406. See id. § 147.131(a) (incorporating the definition from I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) 
(2012)).
407. If the entity is self-insured, it can provide Form 700 to the third-party administrator
of its health plan.  See id. § 147.131(c)(1)(i). 
408. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of American Jewish Committee et al. in Support of
Respondents at 4–5, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-
1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191), 2016 WL 675867, at *4–5 [hereinafter AJCommittee
Brief Zubik]. 
409. See, e.g., Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d
422 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1559; Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated, No. 15-775, 2016 WL 2842448 
(May 16, 2016); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 
(D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1559; Mich. Catholic Conference & Catholic Family
Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1914 (2015). 
370
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Initially, nearly all the federal appellate courts roundly rejected this claim,
concluding the requirement to fill out Form 700 could not be considered 
a “substantial burden.”410 For example, the D.C. Circuit concluded the
burden could not be viewed as substantial given that “[a]ll Plaintiffs must
do to opt out is express what they believe and seek what they want via a
letter or two-page form. That bit of paperwork is more straightforward
and minimal than many that are staples of nonprofit organizations’ compliance 
with law in the modern administrative state.”411 Nearly all other federal 
courts reached similar decisions.412 But the Eighth Circuit disagreed,
thereby creating a circuit split ripe for the Court to address.413 
The Court indeed granted certiorari in Zubik on the substantial burden 
question, indicating that it would rule on the extent to which complicity
claims might qualify for protection under RFRA.414 However, instead of 
addressing the substantial burden question, the Court—left with only eight
justices at that time because of Justice Scalia’s death in early 2016—chose 
to vacate the nonprofit cases and remand them to the federal courts of 
appeals.415 In so doing, the Court took the extraordinary step of indicating 
a strong desire for the parties to compromise, stating “the parties on remand 
should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward
that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time
410. Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 237. 
411. Id. at 237. 
412. See, e.g., Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 442 (“[C]an the submission of the self-
certification form, which relieves the appellees of any connection to the provision of the 
objected-to contraceptive services, really impose a ‘substantial’ burden on the appellees’ 
free exercise of religion?  We think not. . . . [W]here the actual provision of contraceptive 
coverage is by a third party, the burden is not merely attenuated at the outset but totally 
disconnected from the appellees.”); Mich. Catholic Conference, 755 F.3d at 388 (“The 
government’s imposition of an independent obligation on a third party does not impose a 
substantial burden on the appellants’ exercise of religion. . . . [T]he Government’s instruction 
to insurance issuers and third-party administrators to provide contraceptive coverage does 
not force the appellants to provide, pay for, and/or facilitate access to the coverage.”). 
413. See Sharpe Holdings, 801 F.3d at 937 (“Here, the substantial burden imposed
by the government . . . is the imposition of significant monetary penalties should CNS and HCC 
adhere to their religious beliefs and refuse to comply with the contraceptive mandate or 
the accommodation regulations.”). 
414. See Order Granting Certiorari, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015). 
415. See Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560 (“The Court expresses no view on the merits of 
the cases.  In particular, the Court does not decide whether petitioners’ religious exercise has 
been substantially burdened, whether the Government has a compelling interest, or whether the 
current regulations are the least restrictive means of serving that interest.”). 
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ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and 
equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.’”416 
Jewish institutions, however, filed amicus briefs in Zubik indicating
they were in far less compromising moods.417 COLPA, once again filing 
a brief on behalf of Orthodox Jewish organizations, supported the RFRA 
claimants and focused its argument on the government’s exclusion of 
“independent institutions or entities which are not themselves houses of
worship or their ‘auxiliaries’” from the accommodation provisions of the 
mandate, thereby requiring such auxiliary institutions to self-certify.418 
This was particularly troubling to COLPA given that under Jewish law, 
“[a]lthough the Jewish place of worship—a Synagogue—is a very sacred
location, its sanctity is exceeded by a location where there is communal 
Torah study—a Yeshiva.”419  Thus, setting a precedent that distinguished 
between houses of worship and other religious institutions raised, in COLPA’s 
view, constitutional infirmities that would significantly impact the Jewish
community. 
A brief filed by Orthodox Jewish Rabbis supporting the petitioners attacked 
the broader argument against applying RFRA: to deny the existence of a
substantial burden would lead “courts to weigh theological burdens,” which 
would entail “second-guess[ing] religious adherents’ sincerely held beliefs.
Such a reversal would dramatically weaken RFRA’s protection of religious
liberty.”420 
But numerous Jewish institutions—led by the ADL and including Bend 
the Arc: A Jewish Partnership for Justice, the Jewish Social Policy Action
Network, Keshet, the National Council of Jewish Women, and Women’s 
League for Conservative Judaism—extended the arguments they made in
Hobby Lobby, challenging the RFRA claims asserted by nonprofits on the 
ground that the petitioners had not satisfied the substantial burden requirement.421 
Accordingly, they argued the following:
416. Id. (citation omitted). 
417. See generally AJCommittee Brief Zubik, supra note 408. 
418. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public  
Affairs (“COLPA”) in Support of Petitioners in Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 
15-105, 15-119 & 15-191, at 5, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 
15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191), 2016 WL 159297, at *5. 
419. Id. at 10. 
420. Brief of Amici Curiae Orthodox Jewish Rabbis in Support of Petitioners at 3,
Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119 & 15-191), 
2016 WL 93990, at *3. 
421. Brief of the Anti-Defamation League et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 1–5, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 
15-191), 2016 WL 675862, at *1–5 [hereinafter ADL Brief Zubik]; see also supra note 392 and 
accompanying text. 
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[T]he objective facts do not support a substantial burden. The Government’s opt-
out procedures . . . allow organizations to self-certify that they have religious 
objections to providing contraceptive insurance coverage. The form requires an
organization to write in just four boxes, providing its name, authorized agent’s
name, contact information, and signature.  The form is itself an accommodation 
to alleviate religious objections to directly providing contraceptive coverage.422 
In making this argument, the ADL’s brief emphasized that “[t]he determination 
of whether a burden on religious exercise is substantial requires an objective
assessment of the actual effect of state action.”423 Merely assessing the
sincerity of the religious belief in question should not qualify.424 When
reaching this conclusion, the ADL relied on the Court’s precedent in
Lyng425 as support because “when faced with a religious challenge to the 
construction of a Forest Service road through sacred ground, the Court 
accepted that Indian tribes believed the road posed a ‘grave’ threat to their
religious practice, but it declined to measure the burden by comparison to 
that religious belief.”426 
Moreover, the ADL argued that if the Court found the burden imposed
by the government on the petitioners was substantial, it would violate the 
Establishment Clause for “fail[ing] to wrestle with burdens on third-party 
non-beneficiaries.”427 Relying on the Court’s decision in Estate of Thornton,428 
the brief explained that “shifting adverse effects of religious exercise onto 
third parties—who possess their own First Amendment and RFRA rights— 
is an unconstitutional Establishment Clause violation.”429 
A separate brief filed jointly by the AJCommittee, JCPA, URJ, and 
CCAR hit similar notes.430 Like the ADL, these institutions argued that
“RFRA’s use of the phrase ‘substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion’ necessarily implicates more than the objector’s assertion that his 
or her religious beliefs are offended.”431  Accordingly, they argued for an
objective standard to assess the substantiality of burdens: 
422. ADL Brief Zubik, supra note 421, at 7.
423.  Id. at 10. 
424. Id. at 11–15. 
425. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
426.  ADL Brief Zubik, supra note 421, at 10 (citing Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451). 
427.  Id. at 21. 
428. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
429.  ADL Brief Zubik, supra note 421, at 21 (citing Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. 703). 
430.  See generally AJCommittee Brief Zubik, supra note 408. 
431.  Id. at 5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012)). 
373
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The manifestations of a substantial burden could take a variety of forms not present 
here—financial, volitional, administrative, managerial, or otherwise. And
the manifestations of such a burden need not be secular—a substantial imposition on
the objector’s sincere religious exercise may also suffice—but in all events they
must mean something more than the personal conviction that one’s religious
beliefs are substantially burdened.432 
Not surprisingly, in making this argument, they also relied heavily on Lyng433 
as supporting two propositions. The first was the somewhat standard
proposition that “not all burdens [are] sufficient to warrant an exemption or 
other accommodation.”434 But secondly, and perhaps more importantly,
the brief quoted extensively from Lyng as part of its argument why mere
complicity claims could not qualify as substantial burdens. Thus, the brief 
argued that “the logical consequence of a finding that others’ compliance 
with a law can impose a substantial burden on objectors’ religious exercise is
that there must be ‘no law at all’ addressing whatever happens to be the 
contested issue.”435 And this, the brief contended, was an impossibility because
it fundamentally contravened Lyng’s statement that “government simply 
could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs
and desires. . . . The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and 
it can give to none of them a veto over public programs that do not prohibit
the free exercise of religion.”436 
The heavy reliance by Jewish institutional amici in Zubik on both Estate 
of Thornton and Lyng is a useful marker for increased dissensus among
Jewish institutional amici triggered by the cases at the heart of the culture
wars. In crafting their objections to the RFRA claim in Zubik, both the 
ADL’s and AJCommittee’s briefs leveraged holdings from cases they
previously had viewed as wrongly decided.437 This doctrinal migration 
among some of the progressive Jewish institutions helps demonstrate the 
ways in which some institutions expanded the range of views held among
the broad class of Jewish amici. Thus, the fact that cases like Estate of 
Thornton and Lyng became so central to arguments imposing internal limits 
on the content and quality of RFRA claims highlights the shift from the earlier 
phases of Jewish institutional dissensus to the dissensus typical of the current 
culture war phase. In the 1980s, Jewish institutions gently leveraged external
constraints, such as disestablishment concerns or the compelling nature of 
432. Id. at 5–6. 
433. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
434.  AJCommittee Brief Zubik, supra note 408, at 12–13 (citing Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451–52). 
435.  Id. at 21. 
436. Id. at 21–22 (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451–52). 
437.  The ADL and AJCommittee each filed briefs for petitioners in Estate of Thornton 
showing their support for the parties that the court ultimately decided against. See generally
ADL Brief Thornton, supra note 175; AJC Motion, supra note 176. 
374
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implicated government interests. They almost uniformly lined up with claimants 
asserting religious liberty claims in cases like Estate of Thornton438 and 
Lyng.439 With the rise of the culture wars, however, Jewish institutional
responses have morphed to support new threshold requirements for a prima 
facie religious liberty claim. 
3. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018)
The contraception mandate provided fertile ground for progressive Jewish 
institutions to expand the scope of Jewish dissensus by utilizing new
arguments to address increasingly complex religious liberty claims.  That 
divide ultimately persisted among Jewish institutions in debates at the
very center of the culture wars—namely, debates over same-sex marriage
and, more specifically, public accommodation cases.440  To be sure, it is
not surprising that the prevailing dissensus persisted, continuing past the 
contraception mandate and into public accommodations. Instead, the
continued advocacy through amicus briefs from the same-sex marriage
cases into the realm of public accommodations stands out for something 
quite different; in the public accommodation cases, not only does the predictable
dissensus exist, but it even trickles down to the institutions on the traditionalist 
side of Hunter’s divide. In this way, the dueling amicus briefs in the same-
sex marriage cases as well as the briefs in Masterpiece Cakeshop itself441 
fill out the picture of the growing dissensus among Jewish institutions over
religious liberty. 
Public accommodations cases—cases where businesses, in contravention 
of state law, discriminate in the provision of their services or goods—wound
through various state courts in the better part of the decade preceding 
Masterpiece Cakeshop.442 Importantly, these cases followed a recurring
pattern; the businesses in question refused to provide their services at same-
sex weddings, viewing professional participation in such events through
the provision of goods and services as violating their religious commitments.443 
As a result, those cases lurked in the background as amici filed briefs in
438. The AJCommittee filed a brief for respondents in Lyng, showing its support for 
non-prevailing parties.  See generally Christian Legal Society Brief Lyng, supra note 250. 
439. See, e.g., supra note 437; see also AJCongress Brief Lyng, supra note 248. 
440. For important public accommodations cases, see supra notes 327–29. 
441.  138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
442. See, e.g., supra notes 327–29.
443. See, e.g., supra notes 327–29. 
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the same-sex marriage cases. Repeatedly, in those briefs, parties opined
on whether recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage would
ultimately jeopardize religious liberty rights through the application of
antidiscrimination laws to protect members of the LGBT community.444 
Similarly, many Jewish institutions had already begun staking out positions 
on this issue early on, incorporating analysis on the connection between 
same-sex marriage and antidiscrimination law into briefs filed in the 2013
Supreme Court cases implicating the constitutional right to same-sex marriage: 
Hollingsworth v. Perry445 and United States v. Windsor.446  In so doing, a
number of Jewish institutions pressed the Court to consider the religious 
liberty implications of same-sex marriage as part of any decision on the 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage.  In turn, they highlighted concerns 
that the right to same-sex marriage might lead to legal impingements on 
the rights of religious institutions and organizations opposed to such 
marriages.447 
Perhaps the best example of Jewish institutions addressing this issue in 
advance of Masterpiece Cakeshop is the AJCommittee’s brief in 
Hollingsworth.448  In  Hollingsworth, the Court reviewed a lower court
decision holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited California
from defining marriage as only between a man and a woman—a decision
the Court ultimately vacated on standing grounds.449 Notwithstanding the
focus of the case, the AJCommittee filed a brief that began the summary
of its argument as follows: “The Court must protect the right of same-sex
couples to marry, and it must protect the right of synagogues, churches,
and other religious organizations not to recognize those marriages.”450  In
so doing, the AJCommittee highlighted various areas in which a decision 
upholding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage—an outcome the
brief unequivocally endorsed—would implicate questions of religious liberty, 
444. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in 
Support of Petitioners at 2, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 
WL 4004526, at *2; Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church & State et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, 19–20, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4998227, at *4, 19–20 [hereinafter Americans United Brief 
Masterpiece Cakeshop]. 
445.  133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
446.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
447. See generally, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Jewish Committee in 
Support of the Individual Respondents on the Merits, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 
12-144) 2013 WL 4737187 [hereinafter AJCommittee Brief Hollingsworth]; Brief of  
Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 769319. 
448. See generally AJCommittee Brief Hollingsworth, supra note 447. 
449. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659. 
450. AJCommittee Brief Hollingsworth, supra note 447, at 2.
376
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including public accommodation “disputes . . . about individuals who provide 
creative and personal services that directly assist or facilitate marriages.”451 
The AJCommittee expressly took no position on the range of such
cases, instead choosing to highlight the existence of “doctrinal tools . . . 
available to protect religious liberty with respect to marriage.”452  In its
estimation, those protections relevant to the marriage context included the
free exercise protections afforded to religious organizations to be free from 
governmental intervention into internal religious decisions; free exercise
protection from laws that substantially burden religion but fail the general 
applicability test by providing various other secular exceptions; and statutory
protections under state and federal RFRAs.453 Importantly, the brief ended 
by noting that those tools had limited ability to provide—in the AJCommittee’s 
estimation—sufficient religious liberty protections.454 As a result, it encouraged 
the Court to reconsider Smith to better allow courts to adequately address 
the competing claims in highly charged cases:
Smith appears to mean that if a rule is generally applicable, government can 
refuse religious exemptions whether or not it has a plausible reason, or any
reason at all. A rule of law that takes account of the weight of the competing 
constitutional interests would do justice more often than a rule of law that ignores
those interests.455 
Although the AJCommittee worried about the religious liberty implications
of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage—particularly in the public 
accommodation context—a host of Jewish institutions filed briefs to the
contrary in other cases, expressing that these worries were either overblown
or unfounded. The ADL, and a number of other organizations filed a brief 
in Windsor,456 in which the Court addressed the constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).457  In the brief, these organizations argued 
451. Id. at 7, 26. 
452. Id. at 26–27. 
453. See id. at 27–31. 
454. See id. at 32. 
455.  Id. at 34. 
456.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
457. See generally Brief for the Anti-Defamation League et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent Edith Windsor on the Merits Question, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(No. 12-307), 2013 WL 840022 [hereinafter ADL Brief Windsor] (including as amici the 
Anti-Defamation League; Bend the Arc: A Jewish Partnership for Justice; Central Conference 
of American Rabbis; Congregation Beit Simchat Torah; Hadassah; Jewish Social Policy 
Action Network; Keshet; National Council of Jewish Women; Nehirim; T’ruah: Rabbis 
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that recognition of same-sex marriage had no implications for public 
accommodations—as well as other similar—cases.458 Responding to claims
of other amici that striking down DOMA would immediately subject “those 
who wish to discriminate against gay and lesbian people” to lawsuits pursuant 
to antidiscrimination laws, the brief argued “[t]his argument is nonsensical. . . .
[D]iscrimination against gay and lesbian people is already illegal in many
states, and it will continue to be illegal in those states if this Court overturns 
DOMA.”459 
In another brief, a group of Jewish institutions—including the Rabbinical 
Assembly, the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, Reconstructionist 
Rabbinical Association, and the URJ similarly argued that the constitutional
recognition of same sex marriage would not impact the scope of available
religious liberty protections: “Where lawful civil marriages of same-sex
couples are recognized, the First Amendment’s guarantees continue to 
protect the decisions of those faiths that choose not to solemnize such
marriages, as well as those that do.”460 Therefore the brief continued, striking
down DOMA “would not alter the freedom of all religious communities 
to decide which religious unions are consistent with their beliefs. Nor 
would affirmance burden religious persons and institutions in the pursuit 
of their religious activities or the exercise of conscience.”461 
In supporting this claim, the brief first asserted, citing Hosanna-Tabor, 
that “existing constitutional principles protect the autonomy of various religious 
entities to define religious marriages to comport with their respective 
tenets.”462 Beyond those principles, the brief contended that recognizing
a constitutional right to same-sex marriage would not impact public 
accommodations cases: “the types of disputes anticipated . . . have more 
to do with existing civil rights laws barring discrimination based on sexual 
orientation than with any conflicts that are likely to arise based on marital
for Human Rights-North America; Women of Reform Judaism; and Women’s League for
Conservative Judaism).
458. Id. at 24–26. 
459. Id. at 26. 
460. Brief of Amici Curiae Bishops of the Episcopal Church in the States of California,
Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont,
Washington and the District of Columbia et al. on the Merits and in Support of Affirmance
in Favor of Respondent at 28, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 840023, 
at *28 [hereinafter Episcopal Church Bishops Brief Windsor].
461. Id.
462. Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted). It is worth noting that in its brief, the ADL asserted 
that the protections for religious organizations come from the freedom of association and 
did not reference the religion clauses.  See ADL Brief Windsor, supra note 457, at 27 (“According 
to well-established precedent, people of religious conscience may worship as they please 
and adopt eligibility criteria for membership in their private and religious associations.”). 
378
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status.”463  Other briefs made similar claims.464 All told, these briefs manifested, 
even if somewhat implicitly, a broadly held view among progressive Jewish 
institutions that if the Court were ever to hear a public accommodations 
case, religious liberty protections ought to have no purchase in tilting the 
outcome in favor of religiously motivated businesses.
Similar dissensus among Jewish organizations typified the amicus
briefing in the next same-sex marriage case, Obergefell465—only this time, 
the claims of Jewish institutions became clearer even as the institutional
line-up somewhat differed. In Obergefell, the Agudath Israel filed a brief,
arguing that “[t]he recognition of same-sex marriage poses a threat to the
liberty of religious organizations and individuals whose faith prevents
them from acting in accordance with that recognition.”466 In identifying 
the “most obvious areas of conflict,” the brief identified clashes between
“religious institutions and the people they service or employ.”467 Accordingly, 
the brief highlighted some of the previously litigated public accommodations 
cases, noting that “[t]he Orthodox Jewish community that we represent is
likely to also encounter some of those conflicts.”468 Supporting this worry,
the brief—without expressing a view on the substantive requirements of 
Jewish law—noted it “ha[d] personal knowledge of such an incident. In
a local Jewish community in Maryland, a kosher certification agency was
compelled to certify the kosher status of a gay wedding out of fear of a
discrimination lawsuit.”469 
463. Episcopal Church Bishops Brief Windsor, supra note 460, at 36. Many of these 
organizations filed a brief with identical language in Hollingsworth as well. See Brief of
Amici Curiae Bishops of the Episcopal Church in the State of California et al. in Support 
of Affirmance in Favor of Respondents at 36, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 840012, at *36 (including among amici the Rabbinical 
Assembly; The Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association; Reconstructionist Rabbinical
College; Union for Reform Judaism; and the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism).
464. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae California Council of Churches et al. in Support of
Respondents & Urging Affirmance at 30–31, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-
144), 2013 WL 12354917, at *30–31 (including the Pacific Association of Reform Rabbis
among amici); Brief Amici Curiae of the American Humanist Association & American 
Atheists, Inc. et al. in Support of Respondents Addressing the Merits at 24–25, Hollingsworth, 
133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 823226, at *24–25 (including the Society for Humanistic
Judaism among amici).
465. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
466. Brief of Amicus Curiae Agudath Israel of America in Support of Respondents 
at 17, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1906364, at *17. 
467. Id. 
468. Id. at 19. 
469. Id.
379
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On the other side, the ADL once again filed a brief with a coalition
similar to its Windsor brief,470 although this time it included the
AJCommittee—a somewhat surprising turn given the AJCommittee’s
brief in Windsor.471 Picking up on the argument in the Windsor brief, the
ADL’s brief in Obergefell argued that recognition of same-sex marriage 
was unrelated to the public accommodations cases: “Regardless of whether
the ceremonies are official, vendors have been—and will continue to be— 
subject to any applicable antidiscrimination laws just as they would be if 
they refused to provide service for an interfaith couple or an interracial
couple.”472 In turn, “[a]llowing the ceremonies to be official civil marriage
ceremonies—though important for the couple—will make no difference 
whatsoever to any vendor’s pre-existing obligation to comply with
antidiscrimination laws.”473 To the extent it remained unclear, the brief
continued in the following subsection, titled “Commercial Businesses
Have No Constitutional Right To Discriminate,” asserting that “[a] business
that avails itself of the benefits of doing business with the public must be 
subject to the public’s rules for conducting that business.”474  The brief  
then emphasized that “it is a fundamental principle of public accommodations
law that when a business chooses to solicit customers from the general public,
it relinquishes autonomy over whom to serve.”475 
Another brief, joined by numerous Jewish rabbinical organizations and
schools—including the Jewish Theological Seminary, the Reconstructionist 
Rabbinical Association, the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College and Jewish 
Reconstructionist Communities, and the United Synagogue of Conservative 
Judaism—made parallel arguments.476 This brief argued that recognizing
a constitutional right to same-sex marriage would not “unduly burden
religious persons and institutions in the pursuit of their public, community, or
470. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League in Support of 
Petitioners, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1004712 [hereinafter ADL Brief 
Obergefell] (including as additional amici the American Jewish Committee; Bend the Arc: 
A Jewish Partnership for Justice; Central Conference of American Rabbis; Hadassah: The 
Women’s Zionist Organization of America; Jewish Social Policy Action Network; Keshet; 
The National Council of Jewish Women; Nehirim; Reconstructionist Rabbinical College 
and Jewish Reconstructionist Communities; Society for Humanistic Judaism; T’ruah: The 
Rabbinic Call for Human Rights; Women of Reform Judaism; and Women’s League for 
Conservative Judaism). 
471. See generally AJCommittee Brief Hollingsworth, supra note 447. 
472.  ADL Brief Obergefell, supra note 470, at 28. 
473.  Id. at 28–29. 
474. Id. at 29. 
475. Id. (citing Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 314–15 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)). 
476.  See generally Brief for Amici Curiae President of the House of Deputies of the 
Episcopal Church & the Episcopal Bishops of Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio & Tennessee et 
al. in Support of Petitioners at 28, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 WL
1057623. 
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commercial activities. Religious actors become subject to public 
accommodation laws and other neutral government regulation when they 
engage in the public sphere.”477 Thus, the brief noted that the “tradition
of respect for religious autonomy has, indeed, permitted various religions 
to define religious marriage in ways that would be unenforceable under 
civil law—declining to sanctify or even recognize, for example, marriages
between persons of different faiths and races or successive marriage 
following divorce.”478 
However, when it came to public accommodation cases, the brief stated
that granting a constitutional right to same-sex marriage has “more to do 
with existing civil rights laws barring discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, where such laws exist, than with any conflicts likely to arise
based on marital status.”479 In expressing how such public accommodation
cases ought to be decided, the brief simply pointed to “existing law.”480 
In describing that existing law, the brief implicitly differentiated between
the limited protection afforded commercial institutions and the robust
protections afforded religious institutions. To make this point through the 
existing case law—and thereby express its approval for the distinction 
between religious institutions and for-profit corporations—it contrasted a
2013 public accommodations case where a photographer was found liable 
for refusing to provide her service at a same-sex wedding with Hosanna-
Tabor, which affirmed the ministerial exception so as to “ensure[] that the 
authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter 
‘strictly ecclesiastical’—is the church’s alone.”481 
Given these indications in the initial amicus filings before the Court in
the same-sex marriage cases, the dissensus among Jewish institutions—
between traditionalists and progressives—in the first public accommodations
case before the Court, Masterpiece Cakeshop, was wholly predictable. In 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court addressed the religious liberty claim of
Colorado baker Jack Phillips, who refused to bake a cake for a same-sex
wedding because doing so violated his religious conscience.482 He refused 
even though state public accommodations law prohibited businesses from 
477. Id. at 28. 
478. Id. at 29. 
479. Id. at 33. 
480. Id.
481. Id. (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 
U.S. 171, 194–95 (2012)). 
482.  138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24 (2018). 
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discriminating against customers on the basis of sexual orientation.483 
Moreover, because Colorado had not enacted a state RFRA, Phillips’s 
religious liberty claims hinged on the Free Exercise Clause.484  Given this
background, the case brought to the fore the clash between LGBT and 
religious rights, an issue that in many ways stood at the very center of the
culture wars.485 And given the stakes, numerous Jewish institutions filed 
amicus briefs to provide their own views on how the clash should be resolved. 
Accordingly, amicus filings by Jewish institutions in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
largely replicated the pre-existing dissensus manifested in Hobby Lobby
and the prior same-sex marriage cases before the Court. On the one hand, 
numerous Jewish organizations encouraged the Court to reject Phillips’s
religious liberty claim.486 Such a legal argument was far from novel; given 
that Smith held the Free Exercise Clause provided no protection from laws,
even if the laws incidentally burden religion, so long as those laws were
neutral and generally applicable,487 Phillips’s religious liberty claim faced 
a steep uphill battle. Indeed, a brief joined by, among others, the ADL, Bend 
the Arc, and the National Council of Jewish Women, pressed this point as 
follows: 
[P]etitioners ask this Court to grant them . . . an impermissible license to discriminate.
They claim entitlement to a constitutionally mandated exemption from a neutral, 
generally applicable law intended to protect minority and marginalized groups, 
so that they may legally refuse service to and exclude customers who do not 
conform to their religious views.  The Free Exercise Clause grants no such right.488 
In light of the somewhat straightforward argument supporting the denial 
of Phillips’s religious liberty claim, numerous Jewish groups seized the
opportunity to file briefs geared towards changing the narrative of the
case. For instance, a number of Reform and Reconstructionist Jewish
organizations—including the CCAR—joined other religious groups in
filing a brief that challenged the prevailing characterization of the case as
483. Id. at 1723. 
484. See generally id.
485. See SMITH, supra note 7, at 302–03 (“The contemporary fight over religious freedom
is one battleground—a central one, as it happens—in the larger and essentially religious 
struggle to define and constitute America.”); Horwitz, supra note 12, at 160 (“Same-sex 
marriage and its consequences have become a central, foregrounded, socially contested 
issue.  The church-state consensus, drawn into the gravitational pull of this contest, has been 
put up for grabs as a result.”). 
486. See, e.g., Americans United Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 444, at 2– 
3 (rejecting Phillips’ argument as “a basic misunderstanding of the fundamental protections 
for religious freedom embodied in the First Amendment”). 
487. See supra notes 263–70 and accompanying text. 
488. Americans United Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 444, at 2–3. 
382
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a clash between “LGBT consumers” and “people of faith.”489 Accordingly,
the brief sought to leverage the identity of the amici—as people of faith 
who see marriage as having spiritual significance but who are still 
committed to a vision of the case as implicating prohibited discrimination: 
“[I]t is precisely [the amici’s] understanding of human dignity as both a 
religious value and a feature of this Court’s equal rights jurisprudence that 
leads Amici to view this dispute first and foremost as a discrimination case, 
not a religious liberty case.”490 Indeed, the brief highlighted efforts of religious
organizations to oppose efforts to “enable religious liberty claims to
prevail in a way that would permit discrimination against protected classes
and other minorities, including but not limited to the LGBT community,” 
referencing in a footnote the Reform Jewish community’s opposition to 
claims that for-profit businesses ought to have religious liberty protections.491 
Accordingly, the brief argued that, “contrary to the suggestion of  some  
amici that LGBT equality broadly threatens mainstream religion, an emerging 
consensus among people of divergent faith beliefs [reflects] that enforcing
principles of antidiscrimination in the civic arena is compatible with—or 
at least does not endanger—their religious sensibilities and practices.”492 
Importantly, the brief emphasized that, in its view, numerous other spheres
of religious belief and conduct would remain off limits to government
intervention.493 For example, it took aim at the amicus brief of the Agudath
Israel for arguing that if Phillips’s claim were denied, the government 
“could even force an Orthodox rabbi to preside at a wedding of two men,
or of a Jew and a non-Jew.”494  Citing Obergefell, the brief noted religious
organizations would still have “‘proper protection’ with respect to practices 
consistent with that [religious] understanding.”495  Moreover, the “Constitution’s
longstanding respect for religious autonomy” would ensure that religious 
groups would remain free to maintain doctrines—such as “prohibiting interfaith
marriage” or “declining to recognize the union of those civilly divorced 
489. Brief for Amici Curiae the Central Conference of American Rabbis et al. in
Support of Respondents at 2, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 
WL 5036302, at *2 [hereinafter CCAR Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop]. 
490. Id. at 3. 
491. Id. at 20, 20 n.35 (citation omitted). 
492.  Id. at 19. 
493. See id. at 22. 
494. Id. (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Agudath Israel of America in Support of 
Petitioners at 3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4004519, at 
*3 [hereinafter Agudath Israel Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop]).
495. Id. at 23 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015)). 
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and remarried”—as “religions and persons of faith like Petitioners remain
free to define religious marriage as limited to the union of one man and one
woman and to withhold spiritual blessing from any marriages, or bar those 
entering into them from being congregants at all.”496 In supporting this
claim, the brief referenced the fact that Colorado’s own antidiscrimination 
laws excluded houses of worship or any place “principally used for religious
purposes” from the definition of public accommodations—although it did 
not make clear what the contours of the constitutional protection of such 
houses of worship might be.497 
Other progressive Jewish groups also used their briefs to attack some of 
the case’s underlying narratives. For example, T’ruah, The Rabbinic Call 
for Human Rights, joined a brief of fifteen faith and civil rights organizations
that highlighted the ways in which finding for Phillips would undermine
the rights of religious minorities, arguing that the case was not simply 
about LGBT versus religious rights.498 And Hadassah, The Women’s Zionist
Organization of America, joined—alongside numerous other groups—a 
brief filed by the National Women’s Law Center, which focused on the 
historical importance of public accommodations laws to women.499 
All told, given that the case was argued under the Free Exercise Clause—
as no RFRA applied—briefs arguing against Phillips’s claims did not focus 
on the content or quality of the religious liberty at stake. Thus, nearly all 
such briefs—in stark contrast to much of the briefing in Hobby Lobby and 
Zubik—avoided questions related to the substantiality or attenuated nature 
of the burdens on religious exercise.500 That being said, briefs from progressive
Jewish organizations contested Phillips’s religious liberty claim much in 
the same way they had in the contraception cases.501 This was an alignment 
496. Id. at 23–24. 
497. Id. at 24 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(1) (2018)). 
498. See Brief of Amici Curiae 15 Faith and Religious Civil Rights Organizations in
Support of Respondents at 7–8, Masterpiece Cakeshop,  138  S. Ct. 1719 (No.  16-111), 2017  
WL 5036298, at *7–8 (“Public accommodation laws are essential to protecting against 
religiously motivated discrimination.  Any exemption from these laws, especially one as far-
reaching as the one requested by petitioners, risks causing serious harm to the religious minorities 
who rely on these laws to safeguard their right to equal protection under the law.”). 
499. See Brief of the National Women’s Law Center & Other Groups as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 
WL 6988027, at *3 (“Amici focus on women and the importance of enforcing public 
accommodations laws to ensure the full participation of women in the marketplace.  If the 
Court creates an exemption from the public accommodations law to permit the Company 
to refuse service to a gay couple on First Amendment grounds, the implications of such a 
precedent for undermining the protections of these laws for women are far-reaching.”). 
500. But see CCAR Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 489, at 3 (making oblique 
reference to the lack of a substantial burden at stake and to the attenuated nature of the burden 
on the claimant’s religious exercise). 
501. See generally, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 12. 
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that had become increasingly familiar in this second phase of religious liberty
dissensus among Jewish institutions.
In keeping with this alignment, numerous traditionalist Jewish institutions
filed amicus briefs supporting Phillips. COLPA filed a brief arguing two
points. First, it emphasized the significance of Jewish law’s prohibition
against participating in sinful conduct: “Jewish Law reproaches not only
one’s own violations but, based on a Biblical passage and extensive rabbinic 
interpretation over centuries, also deters active participation in another
person’s conduct that violates religious prohibitions.”502 Second, the brief
argued that imposing liability on Phillips violated Smith’s more narrow 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause because it constituted a “covert 
suppression of particular religious beliefs.”503 The reason: The only possible
justification for imposing Colorado’s public accommodations law against
Phillips “was to compel Phillips and others who have religious objections 
to same-sex marriages to violate their religious convictions and participate 
in the ceremony if another same-sex couple ever requests meaningful 
participation in a same-sex wedding.”504 
Agudath Israel took a similar approach in its brief, although its rhetoric 
was far more direct. Beginning with an explanation that “Jewish law . . . 
prohibits aiding and abetting forbidden practices,” the brief went on to
explain that “Jewish law unequivocally prohibits and condemns homosexual 
practices.”505 Further, it stated that “Jewish law does not limit itself to
religious practices as that term is generally understood, but also governs 
every aspect of day-to-day life[,] includ[ing] tort law, contract law, other 
aspects of business law, and family law.”506 Therefore, based on this
combination of theological commitments, the brief—invoking Braunfeld
v. Brown507—summarized its argument as follows: “Our argument was
summarized by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 56 years ago: ‘The issue 
in this case is whether a State may put an individual to a choice between
his business and his religion. Such a law prohibits the free exercise of 
502. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public Affairs 
(“COLPA”) Filed on Behalf of Orthodox Jewish Organizations in Support of Petitioners 
at 4, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4005661, at *4 [hereinafter 
COLPA Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop]. 
503. Id. at 5 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 534 (1993)). 
504. Id. at 9.
505. Agudath Israel Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 494, at 3 (citation omitted). 
506. Id. at 2. 
507. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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religion.”508   Striking a defiant tone, the brief continued by describing the 
case in culture war terminology: 
The contemporary zeitgeist, however, had made a 180 about-face. Among the 
intellectual and philosophical opinion-shapers of America, a consensus formed
that homosexual activities are just another type of sex, and that same-sex
“marriage” is just a marriage. While U.S. constitutional law may have this
flexibility, Jewish law, based upon the divinely revealed Written Law and Oral 
Law, [is] immutable.  Thus, under Jewish law, homosexual activities remain an 
abomination, and a marriage of two men remains inconceivable.509 
Indeed, in many ways the Agudath Israel’s brief—as well as COLPA’s—
harkened back to positions the organizations had staked out in Bob Jones.510 
Both Masterpiece Cakeshop and Bob Jones shared structural similarities;
both represented complicity claims where the religious claimant argued 
that the law served to pressure them into participating or supporting
conduct viewed by the relevant religious community as sinful.511 For both 
COLPA and the Agudath Israel, such cases highlighted how religious 
liberty protections—even in the complicity cases of the culture wars—were 
necessary to protect religious groups that maintained theologies unpopular in 
the prevailing zeitgeist. 
And yet, notwithstanding these arguments and rhetoric, neither COLPA’s
brief nor the Agudath Israel’s brief made clear whether Jewish law, in fact, 
prohibited the baking of a cake for a same-sex wedding. COPLA described
the theological dilemma as follows: “If an Orthodox Jewish owner of a
limousine service were asked, for example, to provide group transportation 
to a religious ceremony in which participation is prohibited by Torah law,
he could find rabbinic support for claiming that he, like Jack Phillips, would 
be committing a personal sin by complying.”512 Similarly, Agudath Israel 
stated it is 
quite likely that an Orthodox Jewish baker would refuse to design and bake a cake 
for an event celebrating a marriage of two men, and it is likely that an Orthodox
Jewish caterer would refuse to prepare food for it, and that Orthodox Jewish 
photographers, musicians, printers, florists, etc. would refuse to provide their
services.513 
These equivocations—reflecting the multiplicity of legal views under Jewish 
law—captured the continued approach of such organizations to support 
508. Agudath Israel Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 494, at 4 (quoting Braunfeld, 
366 U.S. at 611). 
509. Id. at 6. 
510.  461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
511. Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.  
1719, 1724 (2018), with Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 602 n.28, 602–03. 
512. COLPA Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 502, at 8 (emphasis added). 
513. Agudath Israel Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 494, at 3 (emphasis added). 
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religious liberty claims, even where those claims did not necessarily implicate 
the interest of Jews directly. 
But in this contemporary alignment—with progressive Jewish institutions
continuing to challenge the expansion of religious liberty in culture war 
cases and traditional Jewish institutions continuing to support religious 
liberty cases that do not directly implicate their interests—one brief stands
out as noteworthy. A brief written by law professors Douglas Laycock and 
Thomas Berg—and signed by numerous religious organizations, including 
the OU and the RCA—emphasized the need to protect both members of 
the LGBT community and members of religious communities.514  Indeed,
the brief describes the interest of the amici as “religious organizations who
accept that same-sex civil marriage is the law of the land” and then explains 
that “[m]ost of these amici are involved in ongoing efforts, mostly
unsuccessful so far, to negotiate legislation prohibiting sexual-orientation 
discrimination while providing religious exemptions.”515 
In stark contrast to the culture war language of the Agudath Israel, the
brief signed by the OU and RCA framed the issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop
as follows: 
In its decision protecting the right of same-sex couples to marry, this Court 
affirmed that “the Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach,” allowing 
“persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.” 
Now this Court must hold that religious dissenters from same-sex marriage
have the same liberty to live consistently with their identity.516 
In turn, the brief focused on the inherent religious nature of participation
in a wedding, arguing that the case pit a strong religious liberty interest
against the government’s weaker interest.517  In a particularly noteworthy 
section, the brief—foreshadowing the Court’s eventual decision in Masterpiece
Cakeshop—focused on how the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (CCRC) 
had failed to neutrally and uniformly apply the provisions of the state public
accommodations law, denying protection to Phillips but granting protection 
514. See generally Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4005662 
[Christian Legal Society Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop]. 
515. Id. at 1. 
516. Id. at 2 (citation omitted) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593
(2015)).
517. See id. at 13–16. 
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to Colorado bakers in a parallel case when they refused to bake a cake
denouncing same-sex relationships.518 
The Court, in holding in favor of Phillips, adopted this argument, concluding
that “the [CCRC’s] consideration of this case was inconsistent with the
State’s obligation of religious neutrality.”519 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court noted that one of the commissioners of the CCRC expressed during
one of the hearings how “[f]reedom of religion and religion has been used
to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, 
whether it be the holocaust” and then described claims like Phillips’s as
“one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to 
use their religion to hurt others.”520 Comparing Phillips’s claims to the 
Holocaust made the Supreme Court dubious as to whether the CCRC’s
decision could have been reached fairly and neutrally.521 
In addition, incorporating much of the brief signed by the OU and RCA, 
the Court was also disturbed by what it saw as the inconsistent treatment
of Phillips’s claim. The CCRC found in favor of the couple that filed suit
against Phillips but rejected the similar claims of another consumer who 
filed suit against three bakers for refusing to bake a custom cake with decorations 
that demeaned same-sex marriage by, among other things, incorporating 
biblical verses stating that such marriages were sinful.522 Colorado law,
however, prohibits businesses from discriminating on the basis of religion 
and sexual orientation, leading the Court to conclude that these divergent 
outcomes demonstrated that Colorado had failed to live up to the First
Amendment’s demands of religious neutrality when adjudicating Phillips’
claims.523 
That the Court adopted much of the logic of the amicus brief signed by
the OU and RCA is not itself remarkable for our purposes. But the choice 
of the OU and RCA to forego signing both COLPA’s and the Agudath 
Israel’s briefs is noteworthy when compared to the brief that all four parties 
joined together in Bob Jones.524 As noted above, in Bob Jones, all four
parties filed a brief that highlighted the role of the First Amendment in 
“protect[ing] minorities from the tyranny of the majority,” emphatically 
arguing that it would undermine the core purposes of the Free Exercise 
518. See id. at 18–21. 
519. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
520.  Id. at 1729. 
521. See id. at 1729–30. 
522. See id. at 1730–31. 
523. See id. at 1731. 
524. See generally COLPA Brief Bob Jones, supra note 223 (including Agudath Israel 
of America; National Council of Young Israel; Rabbinical Council of America; Torah 
Umesorah; National Society of Hebrew Day Schools; and Union of Orthodox Jewish 
Congregations of America). 
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Clause if government could withhold benefits “from the minority . . . merely 
because the minority, in pursuit of its religious rights, refuses to conform to
the social practices of the majority.”525 
But in Masterpiece Cakeshop, this Orthodox Jewish consensus over 
how to approach complicity claims split. On the one hand, organizations
like the Agudath Israel and COLPA continued using the argumentative 
and rhetorical structure of Bob Jones, arguing that the Free Exercise
Clause demanded that majoritarian norms should not be deployed against 
minority religious groups with unpopular theologies and practices.526  By 
contrast, the OU and RCA adopted a new approach, intervening in the  
culture wars by encouraging the Court to find a middle path—one that did 
not fit easily with either progressives or traditionalists.  Thus, both organizations 
chose a brief that struck a far more conciliatory tone, pressing the Court to 
resolve the case with a narrower argument that focused on the constitutional 
requirement of a neutral adjudicative process.527 
To be sure, the choice of briefs and arguments is often a strategic
decision that takes a variety of factors into account, including changes in 
doctrine as well as likelihood of success. Yet this choice is noteworthy
given that both organizations had, in the not so distant past, issued press
releases that resolved, in response to debates over same-sex marriage, the 
necessity “to forcefully resist all attempts . . . to legitimize that which our 
Torah, our history and our traditions have deemed illegitimate”528 and 
“call[ed] upon Jews and citizens everywhere to oppose any effort to bestow 
the sanctity of marriage upon same sex couples.”529 The public accommodations
claims in Masterpiece Cakeshop triggered a very different response.  Thus, 
in evaluating the impact of the culture wars on Jewish institutional consensus 
around religious liberty, the growing split even among traditionalist responses 
525. Id. at 10. 
526. See Agudath Israel Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 494, at 6–7, 13; 
COLPA Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 502, at 4–5. 
527. See Christian Legal Society Brief Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 514, at 2–5.
528. OU Convention Resolution Text, ORTHODOX UNION ADVOC. CTR. (Oct. 12, 
2010), https://advocacy.ou.org/ou-convention-resolution-text/ [http://perma.cc/K4SQ-K6RR]. 
The choice of the OU was also somewhat surprising given that it had joined an amicus
brief in Hollingsworth that articulated the values behind traditional, as opposed to same-
sex, marriage. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Ass’n of Evangelicals et al. in Support 
of Petitioners at 6–11, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013
WL 390990, at *6–11. 
529. Same-Sex Marriage, RABBINICAL COUNCIL AM. (Mar. 30, 2004), http://www.
rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=100556 [http://perma.cc/UG9W-XPS8]. 
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to clashes between LGBT and religious rights stands out.  Indeed, on this
count, it is not simply that the culture wars have triggered increasing dissensus
between traditionalist and progressive Jewish institutions, but they have also 
introduced dissensus among the very organizations that retained consensus
even in the face of Bob Jones. 
V. CONCLUSION
We began our discussion with questions about the place of the American
Jewish community in the culture wars over religious liberty. Both in popular 
and academic press, scholars and authors expressed concern that the  
historical place of the American Jewish community would soon be lost.
In the popular press, this was expressed in concerns over demographic 
shifts among denominations, where a growing Orthodoxy would pull the 
traditional place of American Jews under the broader umbrella of conservative 
Christians. And in the academic press, scholars wondered whether classifying
Jews—or maybe just “devout Jews”530—as simply a footnote in a broader 
Christian story distorted the unique place of Jews as between two worlds: 
Neither Christian nor pagan, neither fully traditionalist, nor fully progressive. 
But through an exploration of Jewish institutional amicus briefs before 
the Supreme Court in religious liberty cases, we identified a somewhat 
different story.  Instead of the American Jewish voice being dragged into the
traditionalist camp—or, better yet, the Christian city—the story moved, 
even if somewhat unevenly, in the opposite direction. Thus, historically, 
the consensus position of the American Jewish community aligned with
views regarding religious liberty most closely associated with contemporary
traditionalists. They were full-throated supporters of the religious
accommodation project, unequivocally embracing the need for the law to 
protect religious conduct from substantial burdens on religious exercise.
However, over time, consensus around this view waned. In the early 
years of dissensus, Jewish institutions began to splinter over the principles 
limiting religious liberty. These limiting principles, at least initially, lived 
on the outskirts of the doctrine; Jewish institutions remained deeply protective 
of the substantial-burden framework but divided over when concerns over 
disestablishment or antidiscrimination norms—concerns that could constitute 
compelling government interests—ought to supersede religious liberty. In
this way, dissensus increased, but it rarely led Jewish institutions to question
whether claimants had a bona fide religious liberty right; those advocating
for limitations simply thought that, at times, other considerations ought to
win out.
530. SMITH, supra note 7, at 13. 
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The culture wars, by contrast, have generated a far deeper and wider
dissensus among Jewish institutions, undermining the fundamental consensus
both between progressive and traditionalist Jewish institutions as well as
between traditionalist groups themselves. In so doing, the culture wars— 
with their increasingly complex and challenging set of dilemmas—have 
led some institutions to adopt new views regarding who is eligible to assert a
religious liberty claim and under what circumstances perceived burdens 
on religious exercise are sufficiently substantial to qualify for legal protection.
Moreover, dissensus has emerged among traditionalist institutions as they
reconsider whether old tactics, views, and rhetoric continue to have purchase
in the age of the culture wars. As a result, the span of views on religious
liberty questions has widened as the poles between Jewish institutional 
traditionalists and progressives—and between traditionalists and traditionalists— 
have moved further apart. 
But precisely because the culture wars have undermined much of the 
long-standing consensus, the possibility that Jewish institutions will develop 
a religious liberty agenda that lives between increasingly prevalent 
dichotomies—traditionalist and progressive, Christian and pagan—has 
grown. Much is now uncertain as to how Jewish institutions will navigate 
new dilemmas that will surely come with successive waves of the culture 
wars. Indeed, instead of concern over whether the culture wars are leading
to the co-opting of the uniquely American Jewish voice on questions of 
religious liberty, the preceding story encourages us that the exact opposite 
is true. American Jewish communities are changing old views and exploring 
new doctrinal alternatives. Where this will lead is far from certain. If there
is any lesson from the past, it is that the future of the Jews and the culture 
wars is yet to be written. 
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